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Abstract
Human cooperation is exceptional in the animal kingdom, and explaining its evolution is a puzzle. One
hypothesis is that the ability to track others’ reputations and to choose our cooperative partners created
biological markets, and competition within these markets selected for cooperators. Here, I test this
hypothesis from the Hadza of Tanzania, one of the last remaining foraging populations. In Chapter 1, I use
longitudinal data tracking cooperation in an economic game and residence patterns. In every year,
contribution levels to the public good are similar within residence camps, fulfilling a necessary condition
for the evolution of cooperation. However, cooperators in previous years were not more likely to live with
cooperators in future years. Further, at the individual level, previous contributions did not predict future
contributions. In Chapters 2 and 3, I use data from a ranking task in which Hadza ranked their campmates
on character traits, hunting ability, and who they would like to live with in the future. In Chapter 2, I
examine whether Hadza agree on perceptions of moral character. The Hadza disagree on which of their
campmates exhibit moral character. The Hadza do agree though on what traits (e.g., generosity and hard
work) contribute to overall moral character. These results indicate that the Hadza use similar criteria for
evaluating moral character but do not agree on who exhibits these traits. The lack of agreement on
perceptions of moral character may be due to the lack of stable moral dispositions among the Hadza.
Finally, in Chapter 3, I examine which traits the Hadza prefer when choosing potential campmates. I find
that the Hadza have only weak preferences to live with campmates that exhibit characters traits, and
instead have stronger preferences to live with men who are better hunters. Further, there is no evidence
that being a preferred campmate results in any benefits to one’s reproductive success, further
undermining partner choice theories. Together, these results indicate that partner choice and other
reputation-based strategies do not maintain cooperation among the Hadza, and more broadly, suggests
that such mechanisms were not responsible for the evolution of human cooperation.

Degree Type
Dissertation

Degree Name
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Graduate Group
Psychology

First Advisor
Coren L. Apicella

Keywords
evolution of cooperation, Hadza, hunter-gatherers, moral character, partner choice, reputation

Subject Categories
Social Psychology

This dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/3535

ACKNOWLEDGMENT
Appropriate to a dissertation on cooperation, I was only able to complete this with the
help and support of mentors, friends, and family. I want to thank the department for its
support and the opportunity. I would also like to thank my committee, Geoffrey
Goodwin, Michael Platt, and Coren Apicella for their feedback and support on this
dissertation.
I am especially grateful to Coren Apicella for her mentorship, who has truly been
a model advisor over the years. She gave me the freedom and opportunity to pursue a
wide range of research interests, but also challenging and pushing me to learn more and
think deeper. I’m a better scientist because of her. Coren was also supportive, kind, and
encouraging, and always made time for me when I needed. Last year, during the lowest
point of my PhD, Coren looked out for me when no else I did and fought on my behalf,
even though I was not officially her student at the time. I’m really only here now because
of her. In fact, this last year working with Coren has been the best year of graduate school
for me. Thank you, Coren; I could not imagine a better mentor than you.
I am also thankful for the friends and lab mates in graduate school and the support
they provided; from discussing ideas, helping me with new skills, giving feedback, to
encouraging me and being there as friends. Thank you, Fatima Aboul-Seoud, Corey
Cusimano, Molly Elson, Daniel Medina, Eugene Olkov, Keana Richards, Claire Ryder,
Victoria Tobolsky, Megan Williams, and Joyce Zhao.
I only had the opportunity to pursue a PhD because of a number of people who
believed in me and encouraged my love of science. They not only gave me my first
experiences in research, but also advised me each step along my academic career. Thank
ii

you, Daniel Hruschka, Julie Bauer Morrison, Steven Neuberg, Oliver Sng, and Karina
Sokol-Tinsley; I am fortunate that they all remain mentors and role-models in my life.
I would also like to thank my family and my partner, Vivienne Varay, for their
support over the years. Though far in distance, my family was always close in supporting
and cheering me on. And Vivienne especially was patient and encouraging as I pursued
my PhD, and she helped me through all of the setbacks I experienced. I am grateful for
their love and support.
Much of the data in this dissertation were collected from a field season in the Fall
of 2016. This work was generously supported by the Templeton Religion Trust with a
subgrant through the Moral Beacons Project and Wake Forest University. I thank Audax
Mabulla for administrative support in Tanzania. I also thank Endeko Endeko, Deus
Haraja, and Ibrahim Mabulla for their help in data collection and for keeping me alive in
the field (which, to be honest, I did not make it an easy task for them).
Finally, I want to thank Hadza for participating in the research and allowing me
stay among them. It was a unique experience to spend that time with them, and I am
grateful for all the lessons they taught me. I started graduate school with a number of
preconceptions about human behavior, and no academic, article, or argument pushed me
to abandon those assumptions as much as working with the Hadza did. Thank you for
teaching me to appreciate the variation and diversity in human nature.

iii

ABSTRACT
HADZA HUNTER-GATHERERS AND THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN
COOPERATION: EVIDENCE AGAINST PARTNER CHOICE MODELS
Kristopher M. Smith
Coren L. Apicella
Human cooperation is exceptional in the animal kingdom, and explaining its evolution is
a puzzle. One hypothesis is that the ability to track others’ reputations and to choose our
cooperative partners created biological markets, and competition within these markets
selected for cooperators. Here, I test this hypothesis from the Hadza of Tanzania, one of
the last remaining foraging populations. In Chapter 1, I use longitudinal data tracking
cooperation in an economic game and residence patterns. In every year, contribution
levels to the public good are similar within residence camps, fulfilling a necessary
condition for the evolution of cooperation. However, cooperators in previous years were
not more likely to live with cooperators in future years. Further, at the individual level,
previous contributions did not predict future contributions. In Chapters 2 and 3, I use data
from a ranking task in which Hadza ranked their campmates on character traits, hunting
ability, and who they would like to live with in the future. In Chapter 2, I examine
whether Hadza agree on perceptions of moral character. The Hadza disagree on which of
their campmates exhibit moral character. The Hadza do agree though on what traits (e.g.,
generosity and hard work) contribute to overall moral character. These results indicate
that the Hadza use similar criteria for evaluating moral character but do not agree on who
exhibits these traits. The lack of agreement on perceptions of moral character may be due
to the lack of stable moral dispositions among the Hadza. Finally, in Chapter 3, I examine
iv

which traits the Hadza prefer when choosing potential campmates. I find that the Hadza
have only weak preferences to live with campmates that exhibit characters traits, and
instead have stronger preferences to live with men who are better hunters. Further, there
is no evidence that being a preferred campmate results in any benefits to one’s
reproductive success, further undermining partner choice theories. Together, these results
indicate that partner choice and other reputation-based strategies do not maintain
cooperation among the Hadza, and more broadly, suggests that such mechanisms were
not responsible for the evolution of human cooperation.
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INTRODUCTION
Human cooperation differs from cooperation in other species in scope and scale.
Whereas non-human animals cooperate almost exclusively with kin (Hamilton, 1964) or
in dyads between known individuals (Trivers, 1971), humans regularly cooperate in
groups with unrelated strangers. For example, people recycle, donate blood, tip servers,
and vote. How humans evolved this propensity to cooperate is a puzzle to evolutionary
biologists, and attempts to solve the puzzle have led to a dizzying array of proposed
explanations (Rand & Nowak, 2013). What is needed then is not another explanation for
the evolution of human cooperation, but data to test the already existing explanations.
One common and necessary element of the different explanations for human
cooperation is positive phenotypic assortment. That is, cooperation must cluster, such that
the benefits of cooperation preferentially flow to other cooperators (Apicella & Silk,
2019; Eshel & Cavalli-Sforza, 1982; Nowak, 2006; Wilson & Dugatkin, 1997). When
cooperators cluster, they avoid costly exploitation from freeriders and the benefits of
mutual cooperation offsets the cost of helping other. The variety of proposed
explanations for human cooperation simply describe different mechanisms that lead to
positive phenotypic assortment.
The different mechanisms proposed to generate assortment on cooperation can be
categorized into two broad classes. The first class is behavioral change mechanisms,
which generate assortment by changing the behavior of others. This includes mechanisms
such as social and cultural learning (Boyd & Richerson, 1982, 2009), social contagion in
networks (Fowler & Christakis, 2010; Rand, Nowak, Fowler, & Christakis, 2011),
punishment (Boyd & Richerson, 1992; Gintis, 2000), or even a combination of
1

punishment and social learning (Chudek & Henrich, 2011; Henrich & Boyd, 2001).
Through these mechanisms, cooperators can change the behavior defectors, allowing for
cooperation to cluster. Many of these mechanisms though are costly for cooperators, and
often creates a second-order cooperative dilemma. To solve this problem, theorists
often—though not always—invoke group selection and gene-culture co-evolution as
other necessary mechanisms to explain human cooperation (Henrich, 2004).
The second class of mechanisms proposed to generate assortment is reputationbased mechanisms. These are mechanisms in which people track the reputation of others
and condition their own behavior on others’ reputation. This can include whether to
cooperate or defect on another person, such as indirect reciprocity (Alexander, 1987;
Nowak & Sigmund, 2005), or whether to even interact with a person at all, such as
partner choice models (Aktipis, 2011; Barclay, 2013; Baumard, André, & Sperber, 2013).
Further, partner choice can create a biological market (Barclay, 2016a; Noë &
Hammerstein, 1994), in which cooperative partners compete for access to other partners.
This can lead to increased cooperation (Barclay & Willer, 2007; Hardy & Van Vugt,
2006) and further clustering of cooperators. These mechanisms are also generally
assumed to be low-cost in a mobile organism, such as humans, and do not require group
selection. As such, skeptics of group selection (Pinker, 2015), argue these mechanisms
are more plausible than many of the proposed behavioral change mechanisms.
In this dissertation, I examine whether partner choice maintains cooperation in the
Hadza of Tanzania, one of the last remaining groups of hunter-gatherers (Marlowe,
2010). I focus on partner choice for three reasons. First, partner choice has become
increasingly popular among researchers, most notably in moral psychology. The problem
2

of evaluating and choosing potential partners is thought to be at the heart of many moral
phenomena, including evaluations of moral character (Landy, Piazza, & Goodwin, 2016;
Wojciszke, Bazinska, & Jaworski, 1998), the role of mental states in moral judgments
(Young & Tsoi, 2013), moral licensing (Barclay, 2016a), deontological moral judgments
(Everett, Faber, Savulescu, & Crockett, 2018), fairness (Baumard et al., 2013), among
others. Second, and related to the previous point, partner choice is well supported in
Western populations. Finally, partner choice seems particularly relevant to huntergatherers. Hunter-gatherers are nomadic with fluid residence patterns, such that they have
regular opportunities to choose new partners. And because of their harsh environment,
they depend on each other to cooperate in a number of domains, including food sharing,
protection, and childcare (Apicella & Crittenden, 2016), so that the problem of deciding
who to cooperate with has important consequences for hunter-gatherers.
Studying cooperation in hunter-gatherers, and especially Hadza, gives some
insight into its evolution. For most of our evolutionary history, human ancestors lived as
hunter-gatherer, and though contemporary hunter-gatherers are surely different from
ancestral humans, their lifestyle and ecologies better approximate ancestral conditions
than do university students. At minimum, we can start to understand the conditions under
which partner choice may be a viable mechanism for maintaining cooperation.
One concern about studying contemporary hunter-gatherers is representativeness;
contemporary foragers live in a variety of environments, from dry deserts in Africa, to
lush rainforests in South America, and even to the extreme cold of the Arctic, and one
group is not representative of all foragers. However, on a number of demographic and
ecological variables, including caloric intake, number of children born, mortality rates,
3

and others, the Hadza are at or near the median value (Marlowe, 2010), so they are at
least not outliers among foragers.
I look at three key prediction that follow from the partner choice theory of
cooperation. First, people should prefer to live with more cooperative individuals.
Chapters 1 and 3 examine this assumption using behavioral data from an economic game
and directly eliciting preferences using a ranking task. Second, people must have stable
cooperative or moral dispositions such that future cooperative behavior can be predicted
from previous cooperative behavior – if not, then choosing a cooperative partner now
does not guarantee that partner will be cooperative in the future. Chapter 1 uses
longitudinal data from an economic game to examine this assumption, and Chapter 2
corroborates this result using independent observer rankings. Finally, for the trait to
evolve, there must be a benefit to being a preferred partner that offsets the cost of
cultivating a reputation as a cooperator. Chapter 3 examines the correlation between
being a preferred campmate and reproductive success to test whether being a desirable
social partner improves fitness.
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CHAPTER 1: HUNTER-GATHERERS MAINTAIN ASSORTAVITY IN
COOPERATION DESPITE HIGH-LEVELS OF RESIDENTIAL CHANGE AND
MIXING
Widespread cooperation is a defining feature of human societies from hunter-gatherer
bands to nation states. But explaining its evolution remains a challenge. While positive
assortment of cooperators is recognized as a basic requirement for the evolution of
cooperation, the mechanisms governing assortment are debated. Moreover, the social
structure of modern hunter-gatherers, characterized by high mobility, residential mixing
and low genetic relatedness, undermine assortment and add to the puzzle of how
cooperation evolved. Here, we analyze four years of data (2010, 2013, 2014, 2016)
tracking residence and levels of cooperation elicited from a public goods game in Hadza
hunter-gatherers of Tanzania. Data were collected from 56 camps, comprising 383 unique
individuals, 137 of whom we have data for two or more years. Despite significant
residential mixing, we observe a robust pattern of assortment necessary for cooperation to
evolve: In every year, Hadza camps exhibit high between-camp and low within-camp
variation in cooperation. We find little evidence that cooperative behavior within
individuals is stable over time or that similarity in cooperation between dyads predicts
their future cohabitation. Both sets of findings are inconsistent with models that assume
stable cooperative and selfish types, including partner choice models. Consistent with
social norms, culture, and reciprocity theories, the strongest predictor of an individual’s
level of cooperation is the mean cooperation of their current campmates. These findings
underscore the adaptive nature of human cooperation – particularly its responsiveness to
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social contexts – as a feature important in generating the assortment necessary for
cooperation to evolve.
Introduction
The scope and scale by which we help one another, including cooperative acts
with those who bear no genetic relation to us, is considered a hallmark of being human.
And yet, this emblematic feature of our humanity has challenged scientific thinking
(Boyd & Richerson, 2006; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Silk & Boyd, 2010). How can
natural selection favor costly cooperation in the face of possible exploitation by
defectors? Biologists have proposed multiple theoretical models to explain cooperation,
but there is little evidence on what theories actually explain human behavior in
evolutionarily-relevant settings. To understand this, we analyze data on cooperation and
migration patterns in a hunter-gatherer population over a six-year period. Crucially, the
data contain detailed information about how individual cooperative behavior persists, and
how cooperators sort across time and space – vital elements that tease apart the most
prominent theoretical models. And the presence of positive assortment of cooperators in
space is a fundamental requirement of these models (Fletcher & Doebeli, 2009; Nowak,
Tarnita, & Antal, 2010).
Current hunter-gatherers live in dynamic fission-fusion societies with substantial
inter-group mixing and consequently, low within-group relatedness (Hill et al., 2011).
This mobility poses a challenge to assortment. Common descent, where individuals
preferentially interact with kin (Hamilton, 1964), and reciprocity, where individuals limit
their cooperation to known reciprocators (Trivers, 1971) can generate assortment, but
social mobility undermines it by decreasing relatedness among group members and
6

allowing cooperative groups to be invaded by free-riders or “rovers” (Dugatkin &
Wilson, 1991; Enquist & Leimar, 1993). As such, these classic models fall short in
explaining how cooperation evolved in early humans under these presumed social
dynamics.
For this reason, three additional classes of theoretical models explaining
cooperation and assortment have been emphasized. In models of biological markets
involving partner choice, individuals compete for the most cooperative partners and the
most cooperative choose each other (Barclay, 2016a). In models involving conditional
strategies that respond to group-level behaviors, such as generalized reciprocity (Pfeiffer,
Rutte, Killingback, Taborsky, & Bonhoeffer, 2005) and/or the switching of groups
(Aktipis, 2011), cooperation can stabilize when the groups are small (Pfeiffer et al.,
2005). In models of gene-culture co-evolution, culturally evolving social norms,
supported by an underlying norm-psychology, can generate within-group similarity and
between-group differences in cooperation (Chudek & Henrich, 2011).
While nearly all models involve some degree of behavioral flexibility such that an
individual’s level of cooperation is contingent on the social environment, partner choice
models assume that individuals have stable traits, often genetically determined, on which
the choice of partners is based (Aktipis, 2011; Eshel & Cavalli-Sforza, 1982; J. M.
McNamara, Barta, Fromhage, & Houston, 2008; Noë & Hammerstein, 1994). In these
models, individuals can leave current partners or reject prospective partners based on
their observations and past interactions. The real-world applications of these models
hinge on the existence of trait-like differences in cooperativeness. Yet, few studies have
examined longitudinal stability in cooperativeness in humans (Peysakhovich, Nowak, &
7

Rand, 2014; Volk, Thöni, & Ruigrok, 2012), and none have examined it in natural
settings between members of existing social groups who know each other well.
To tease apart these existing theories, we study cooperation in an extant huntergatherer population – the Hadza of Tanzania – who provide an important test case for
evolutionary models of cooperation. Their daily life is marked by widespread sharing of
food, labor, and childcare and their lifeways more closely approximate pre-Neolithic
populations compared to samples drawn from Western Educated Industrialized Rich and
Democratic (WEIRD) societies (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010).
Method
Population
The Hadza are nomadic foragers occupying the Lake Eyasi basin within the Great
Rift Valley in Northern Tanzania. They sleep outside under the stars or in makeshift huts
constructed of grass and trees. Approximately 1,000 individuals identify as Hadza, but
only 200-300 individuals obtain the majority of their calories by hunting and gathering. It
is this latter group that is the focus of this research.
Men hunt birds and mammals using bows and poison-tipped arrows and collect
honey. Women gather plant foods including baobab fruit, berries, and tubers. Food is
shared widely within camps, especially big game but producers of the food can channel
the food in ways that benefit their kin (Wood & Marlowe, 2013). Childcare is also shared
(Crittenden & Marlowe, 2008).
The Hadza live in temporary camps that average about 30 individuals. Camps
generally consist of several unrelated nuclear families. Relatedness within camps is low
with primary kin comprising, on average, 1.43 and 1.93 of men and women’s campmates
8

respectively (Hill, Wood, Baggio, Hurtado, & Boyd, 2014). Typical of most
contemporary hunter-gatherers, residence patterns are fluid and are best described as
fission-fusion grouping (Marlowe, 2010). Camps can merge or split. Individuals too, can
freely relocate to new camps. Every 4-8 weeks entire camps shift location usually in
response to resource availability. Because the Hadza have few capital goods and personal
possessions, the physical costs associated with moving remain low.
While there is striking diversity among forager societies, it is thought that the
social, economic and political arrangements of the Hadza are similar to other huntergatherer societies. A study of hunter-gatherer social life using ethnographic data from
437 past and present foraging societies found that the vast majority of forager societies,
including the Hadza, live in small groups, practice central place foraging and food
sharing (Marlowe, 2010). The Hadza also fall at or near the median value on a variety of
key demographic traits such as the percentage of calories contributed to the diet by men
and women, infant mortality rate, fertility rate, inter-birth intervals and so on (Marlowe,
2010). Thus, apart from the fact the Hadza still maintain a subsistence lifestyle, there is
good reason to believe that they are not outliers in other major respects.
Ethno-tourism, which largely began about 10-15 years ago has had the largest
impact on Hadza life. And tourists visiting the Hadza continue to rise each year. While
tourists can now be found in every region of Hadzaland, the vast majority of visits take
place in camps on the north-eastern side of Lake Eyasi, close to the village Mangola, due
to its proximity to paved roads that lead to Arusha and safari parks (Figure 1.1). Tours
usually last a couple of hours and culminate with a cash payment to the camp which then
the Hadza can spend in the village.
9

The Hadza have been described as having little belief in omniscient, moralizing
gods (Apicella, 2018; Marlowe, 2010) but they do engage in a number of important
rituals including a sacred epeme dance and meat-eating rituals (Marlowe, 2010). These
rituals are thought to bond participants to one another (Hill et al., 2014).
Sample
Across years, we visited 56 Hadza camps collecting data from 383 unique
individuals. For 137 participants, we have data from at least two years; Table 1.1 presents
the samples sizes for each and the number of participants in multiple years. The mean age
was similar across the years, ranging from 37 to 40 and women comprised 51%, 42%,
49% and 46% of the sample in 2010, 2013, 2014, and 2016, respectively; Table 1.2
presents further summary statistics of the demographic variables.

10

Table 1.1. Sample Sizes Within and Across Years
Year

2010

2013

2014

2016

2010

191

46

69

42

99

57

31

170

40

2013
2014
2016

127

Note. Total number of participants in each year on the diagonal. Other cells indicate
number of participants in both years.

Table 1.2. Descriptive Statistics for Demographic Variables in Each Year
Measure
Males
Married
Age
Number of living

2010

2013

2014

2016

n = 94

n = 57

n = 86

n = 58

n = 152

n = 76

n = 130

n = 90

37.1 (11.0)

40.0 (12.9)

39.6 (13.4)

37.6 (14.6)

3.1 (2.3)

3.3 (2.4)

3.5 (2.6)

3.2 (2.6)

n = 106

n = 53

n = 63

n = 37

children
Near market
Close relationships

0.12 (0.12)

0.14 (0.16)

Formal education

1.4 (2.7)

1.2 (2.5)

Household size

4.2 (2.2)

2.7 (2.0)

Food concern for the

n = 56

next month
Food concern for the

n = 53

next year
Trade

0.5 (0.8)

Note. For descriptive statistics, values are counts or mean (standard deviation in
parentheses) for that variable in each year.

11

Data collection
Data was collected in four separate years – usually during the dry season – over a
six-year period (2010, Aug/Sept; 2013, July; 2014, Oct/Nov; 2016, Aug/Sept). Data
collection was supervised by different authors in different years: (CLA in 2010, 2013; IM
in 2014 and KMS in 2016). In each year, camps were visited using snowball sampling.
After establishing contact with the first camp, Hadza would direct the researchers to the
next nearest camp. GPS coordinates were recorded for all camps in each year, with the
exception of 2016 when the GPS receiver met an unfortunate end. Nevertheless, we were
able to divide the camps in 2016 into market and nonmarket groups based on their
general proximity to the village (Figure 1.1).

12

Figure 1.1. Map of camp locations and mean contributions. Circles represent the camps
visited colored by year of data collection. The size of the point signifies the mean public
goods contribution in the camp. GPS data are not available in 2016 due to missing
equipment. The camps in 2016 are grouped by whether they were located in the market
vs non-market region, but their placement is otherwise random.

Public goods game
We used a public goods game as our measure of cooperation. This game is
directly applicable to hunter-gatherer life where collective action problems are faced by
groups on a daily basis. We used a food item instead of money since explanations for the
evolution of cooperation have highlighted the importance of food sharing (Jaeggi & van
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Schaik, 2011; Kaplan & Gurven, 2005; Kaplan et al., 1985). The methods for the public
goods game elicitation in the Hadza has been described previously (Apicella, Marlowe,
Fowler, & Christakis, 2012).
Cooperation was elicited by examining participants’ voluntary contributions in a
public goods game played with adult members of their camp. All games were conducted
in Swahili and inside a vehicle for privacy. All adults in each camp were invited to
participate with the exception of the very elderly and infirm. In 2010, 2013 and 2014 the
game was played on the last day the researcher was in camp in order to limit possible
discussion. Participants were also told that the game was secret. Since decisions were
made in private, any assertions made by participants regarding their decision need not be
truthful. In 2016, the game was played throughout the researcher’s stay in the camp.
Importantly, we find the same pattern of results.
Participants were endowed with four straws of 100% pure honey (2010,
Honeystix, GloryBee foods Inc. 2013, 2014, Honey Stix, Stakich Inc.), a prized food of
the Hadza (Berbesque & Marlowe, 2009). Each honey stick contains roughly 15 calories.
Participants then faced the decision of how to divide their honey sticks into a private
account and a public account. Participants were told that the goods would be distributed
evenly with all other adult camp members who also played the game. They were
instructed that they could keep any amount from 0-4 sticks of the honey or donate them
to the public goods by inserting them into an opaque cardboard box with an opening at
the top. Participants were told that for every stick of honey they donated, the researcher
would donate an additional 3 sticks of honey to the public pot, and that, after all adult
campmates played the game, the honey would be divided equally among them.
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Participants were also told that they would receive their undonated honey at the same
time as the public honey was distributed to avoid confounding generosity with patience
and that their decisions would be secret. Before participants made their decision, the
researcher simulated all their possible choices so that subjects were shown the additional
amount of honey added to the box for each decision. The Hadza have had experience
playing various games to measure economic (e.g. endowment effect and risk) and social
preferences (e.g. dictator, ultimatum, third-party punishment) with researchers over the
last decade (Apicella, Azevedo, Christakis, & Fowler, 2014; Henrich, 2006; Henrich et
al., 2001; Marlowe, 2004a).
Additional control variables
Basic Demographics. Age, marital status, spouse’s names and reproductive
histories were recorded each year.
Education. Participants were asked the number of years that they attended school
in 2013 and 2016.
Household size. We asked participants the number of other individuals living in
their household in 2013 and 2016. This typically includes children and spouse and
occasionally other close family members.
Concerns about food. In 2013, participants were asked two forced choice
questions about whether they were worried there would be enough food for their family
in 1) over the next month or 2) over the year. Participants answered yes or no to both
questions, such that a “yes” indicated participants were worried about having enough
food.
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Trade. In 2013, participants were asked to estimate how many days out of the past
seven they personally went to a market or trade center to buy or sell something.
Risk. In 2013, 76 of the participants who played the public good game also
completed a task measuring risk preferences. Participants were endowed with 4 honey
sticks and then asked to bet any number of those sticks, with a 50/50 chance of doubling
the bet or losing all gambled honey sticks.
Close Relationships in Camp. In 2010 and 2016, we asked participants to provide
the names of their biological parents, which allowed us to identify primary kin (full
siblingships and parent-child relationships) living together. For each individual, we then
calculated the proportion of their campmates that were primary kin or a spouse as a
measure of “close relationships.”
Time of Day. In 2010, 2013, and 2014, the public goods game was played after all
other data were collected and in a short time period. Time was not recorded in these three
sample years. In 2016, the public goods game was played throughout the study period so
that the time the game was played varied within camps. Time of day was categorized into
three periods: morning if the game was played between 8:00 and 12:00, afternoon if
played between 12:00 and 16:00, and evening if played between 16:00 and 18:00.
Quantification and statistical analysis
Software
All analyses were conducted in R. For data manipulation, we used the tidyverse
(Wickham, 2017b), magrittr (Bache & Wickham, 2014), and dplyr (Wickham, 2011)
packages. For regression analyses with robust standard errors, we used the lmtest (Zeileis
& Hothorn, 2002), multiwayvcov (Graham, Arai, & Hagströmer, 2016) and sandwich
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(Zeileis, 2004) packages. For visualizations, we used the ggplot2 (Wickham, 2009),
scales (Wickham, 2017a), gridExtra (Baptiste, 2017), GGally (Schloerke et al., 2017),
RColorBrewer (Neuwirth, 2014), ggmap (Kahle & Wickham, 2013), geosphere
(Hijmans, 2017), network (Butts, 2008), sna (Butts, 2016), and igraph (Csardi & Nepusz,
2006) packages.
Variance in public good contributions
To test if public goods contributions clustered within camps, we measured
variance between camps and variance within camps in public goods contributions.
Variance between camps was the variance in camp mean contributions between camps,
and variance within camps was the mean variance within each camp between individuals
in public goods contributions. For each year, we then simulated the population
distribution of these values. Public goods contributions were randomly re-assigned
without replacement within the population structure. For each run, the variance between
and within camps in public goods contributions was saved. The actual variances were
compared to the distribution of simulated variances; if the actual variances fell within the
extreme tales of the distribution (2.5% or 97.5%) the variances were determined to be
significantly different from chance. We also computed FST values for each simulation run
and the observed value by dividing between-camp variance by total variance in public
goods contributions.
Regression analyses
For regression analyses that did not involve variables from previous years, all
observations in 2010, 2013, 2014, and 2016 were used. All models had robust standard
errors clustered on the individual. For models that include mean camp public goods
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contribution, we calculated for everyone the mean of other camp members’ contribution
such that an individual’s mean camp public goods contribution did not include ego’s own
contribution. For these analyses, robust standard errors were also clustered on the camp.
For regression analyses that involved variables from previous years, observations in
2013, 2014, and 2016 were included only if the individual was in the previous sample
year. For these analyses, robust standard errors were clustered on the individual, and if
the analysis include mean camp public goods contribution, they were clustered on the
camp as well.
Analysis of dyads living together in future years
We constructed a dataset of dyads to analyze who lives with whom in each year.
To do this, we went through 2010, 2013, and 2014 and for each individual i in the sample
at time t and time t + 1, we went through each individual j at time t and recorded whether
i and j lived in the same camp at time t, at time t + 1, and their similarity in public goods
contributions at time t, as well as their similarity on demographic variables at time t.
Similarity scores were calculated by finding the absolute value of the difference between
i and j on the variable and multiplying that value by -1 so that greater values indicate
more similarity on the variable. We used a binary logistic regression and regressed
whether i and j lived together at time t + 1 on the other variables with robust standard
errors clustered on dyads.
Results
Cooperators cluster in camps each year
We first tested if individuals with similar public goods contributions cluster
within camps each year. We compared the observed variance in public goods
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contributions with variance from 1,000 simulations. The simulations randomized
participants and their contribution to different camps, but kept the population structure
fixed (Apicella et al., 2012). For each simulation and the actual data, we measured the
mean variance in public goods contributions between participants within each camp
(within-camp variance) and the variance in mean camp public goods contributions across
all camps (between-camp variance). In each year, less variance was observed withincamps and more variance was observed between-camps than expected in a random
population (p < 0.05, Figure 1.2). The 2010 results have been previously reported
(Apicella et al., 2012). The long-term data indicate that assortment is a consistent feature
of hunter-gatherer life, year after year.

Figure 1.2. Difference between actual and simulated variance within and between
residence camps in public goods contributions. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
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We also analyzed between-group variation by computing an FST statistic for each
year. FST typically quantifies the genetic differentiation between populations, but can be
used to quantify between-group variation in cultural traits (Bell, Richerson, & Mcelreath,
2009). FST is useful to consider here because if FST is large enough, then individuallydeleterious but group-beneficial behaviors can evolve (Price, 1972). In 2010, 2013, 2014,
and 2016, FST = 0.26, 0.33, 0.24, and 0.39, respectively, and in every year was greater
than expected in a random population, p < 0.05 (see Figure 1.3). These values are higher
than observed genetic differentiation between nation-states, and are more similar to
estimates of cultural differentiation between populations (Bell et al., 2009).
We examined whether this assortment was specific to cooperative decisionmaking or if other economic decision-making, specifically risk preferences, showed
similar assortment. Using the risk preference data from 2013, we again simulated the
between-camp and within-camp variance of risk preferences in a random population. The
observed FST = 0.35 was greater than expected in a random population, 95% FST = 0.26.
Moreover, contributions in the public good and honey sticks gambled were correlated, r
(74) = 0.28, p = 0.015. We tested if cooperation remained clustered when controlling for
risk preferences; again, the observed FST = 0.28 for contributions to the public good
controlling for risk preference was greater than expected in a random population, 95%
FST = 0.26. Finally, we also tested if risk preferences remained clustered within camps
when controlling for contributions to the public good. They did; the observed FST = 0.33
for risk preferences controlling for contributions to the public good was greater than
expected in a random population, 95% FST = 0.27. That is, cooperation and risk were both
independently clustered within camps.
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Figure 1.3. Simulated and observed FST values for public good contributions. We
simulated and computed FST values of PG contributions for a random population for each
year. The dashed line indicates where 95% of the simulated values fall below, and the
solid line indicates the observed FST values.

The observed assortment on cooperation is remarkable because the Hadza, like
other hunter-gatherers, have flexible living arrangements and high rates of migration (Hill
et al., 2011, 2014). We too observe high rates of residential change. We calculated for
each person the proportion of campmates at time t that lived in same camp with the
individual at time t + 1. The mean proportion of repeated campmates was 21.9%. While
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camp residence changes yearly, we still see public goods contributions clustering within
camps each year.
No dispositional types or preference for cooperators
Assortment provides an overall solution to the problem of cooperation, but the
mechanisms responsible for it are debated. One mechanism we explore is partner choice,
where cooperation is sustained because people choose to interact with cooperators and
the most cooperative choose each other (Barclay, 2016a). Partner choice models often
assume that individuals have a stable, sometimes genetically determined, level of
cooperation and individuals choose and reject partners based on this (Eshel & CavalliSforza, 1982; J. M. McNamara et al., 2008; Noë & Hammerstein, 1994). Under these
models then, we should expect Hadza individuals to exhibit stable cooperative behavior.
We also expect that behavior in the public goods at time t to relate to camp residency at
time t + 1 with two possible patterns. If camp residency works like a market (Barclay,
2013, 2016a; Noë & Hammerstein, 1994), with cooperative individuals being sought after
and thus choosing each other, then we should observe individuals with similar
cooperative levels at time t living with each other at time t + 1. However, if camp
residency does not work like a market but cooperators are still preferred, then we should
observe cooperators retaining more campmates between years.
We examined whether individuals’ public goods contributions were related across
years (Figure 1.4). Specifically, we tested whether current and past contributions were
correlated for individuals in contiguous samples (n = 143 observations) by regressing
public goods contributions at time t on contributions at time t – 1 controlling for year. In
this and all subsequent regressions, we include robust standard errors clustered on
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repeated observations. There was no relationship between individuals’ current and
previous contributions, b = 0.00, SE = 0.09, t (139) = 0.05, p = 0.959; this remains
nonsignificant when controlling for demographic variables and exposure to markets. We
considered the possibility that individuals prefer to give relative to the camp mean; that
is, some people prefer to contribute less than, more than, or as much as their campmates
across years. We computed the difference between a person’s public goods contribution
and the mean of the rest of their campmates and repeated the analysis again with these
values. There was no relationship between contributions relative to campmates’
contribution at time t – 1 and contributions relative to campmates’ contributions at time t,
b = 0.01, SE = 0.10, t (132) = 0.06, p = 0.950.
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Figure 1.4. Contributions at time t by contributions at time t – 1. The unit of analysis is a
participant year. Gray circles’ size is proportional to the count of individuals. Blue circles
represent the average of the contribution in the following year as a function of the
contribution in the current year. Bars represent 95% CI.

Are individuals with higher public goods contributions more likely to continue
living with their campmates in the future? To test this, for 2010, 2013, and 2014, we
calculated for each individual who was in the sample at time t and time t + 1 the
proportion of campmates at time t that lived in the same camp with the individual at time
t + 1. We regressed public goods contributions at time t on the proportion of repeated
campmates. There was a negative but nonsignificant, relationship. Individuals who
contributed more at time t had fewer repeated campmates at time t + 1, b = -0.02, SE =
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0.01, t (141) = -1.92, p = 0.057. Thus, there is no evidence that cooperators continue to
live with more of their campmates.
To further test if cooperative individuals were choosing to live with similarly
cooperative individuals, we tested if the absolute difference in public goods contributions
in a past year predicted whether Hadza will live together in a future year. We created a
dataset for 2010, 2013, and 2014 of every possible dyad in each year, removing dyads if
neither individual was present in the next sample. This resulted in 21,086 observations
with 18,126 unique dyads across years. Of these observations, 789 (3.9%) of dyads were
in the same camp. Using a binary logistic regression, we regressed whether the dyad lived
in the same camp at time t + 1 on the similarity of public goods contributions at time t.
Individuals who contributed similar amounts were not more likely to live in the same
camp in future years, b = 0.01, SE = 0.04, OR = 1.01, Z = 0.24, p = 0.814, which
remained nonsignificant after controlling for demographics variables (see Table 1.3).
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Table 1.3. Binary Logistic Regression on Dyads Living in the Same Camp
b (SE)

OR

Z

p

-3.51 (0.17)

0.03

-20.37

< 0.001

Lived together previously

0.37 (0.14)

1.44

2.56

0.010

Similarity in PG contributions

0.01 (0.04)

1.01

0.24

0.814

Both male

0.18 (0.11)

1.20

1.71

0.087

Both female

0.28 (0.10)

1.33

2.74

0.006

Both married

-0.01 (0.09)

0.99

-0.10

0.922

Both single

-0.67 (0.33)

0.51

-2.03

0.042

Similarity in age

0.01 (0.004)

1.01

1.65

0.099

Similarity in number of living children

0.05 (0.02)

1.05

2.47

0.014

Both lived in market region previously

0.13 (0.11)

1.13

1.10

0.273

Both lived in non-market region

0.48 (0.10)

1.62

4.75

< 0.001

Intercept

previously
Note. Whether the dyad lived in the same camp at time t + 1 was regressed on variables
in the model. All variables in the model are taken from time t.

Campmates influence cooperative behavior
To explore the role of social context we tested whether an ego’s contribution can
be predicted by the mean contribution of their current campmates. First, we calculated for
each person a camp mean contribution excluding ego’s own contribution. We regressed
public goods contributions of ego on the mean contribution of other camp members
controlling for year. We find that for each additional honey stick contributed by camp
members, ego contributed, on average, another half-stick of honey, b = 0.55, SE = 0.15, t
(138) = 3.60, p < 0.001. Note, we control for number of campmates since this affects the
marginal per capita return. The result also remains significant when controlling for sex,
26

age, marital status, reproductive success and market exposure. Further, in 2010 and 2016,
the only years for which we have kinship data, we regressed public goods contributions
on campmates’ mean contributions controlling for number of close relationships (i.e.,
number of primary kin and spouse) in camp. Campmates’ mean contributions remained
significant in this regression, b = 0.79, SE = 0.06, t (314) = 12.53, p < 0.001.
For participants in which we have overlapping data across years, we also examine
whether the mean contribution of an ego’s current campmates is a better predictor of
ego’s current contribution than ego’s past contribution. For each year, we regressed ego’s
current contribution at time t on the mean contribution of their campmates at time t and
ego’s contribution at time t - 1. For each additional honey stick given by camp members,
ego again contributed an additional half-stick of honey, b = 0.50, SE = 0.16, t (132) =
3.11, p = 0.002. There was still no effect of previous contribution on current contribution,
b = -0.01, SE = 0.08, t (132) = -0.15, p = 0.879. The results did not change when
controlling for demographic variables (Table 1.4).
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Table 1.4. OLS Regressions of Public Goods Contribution on Mean Camp
Contribution and Previous Contribution
Model 1
Mean camp contribution

2016

Male

Age

Married

Number of living children

Exposure to market

Number of campmates at time t

Model 3

0.36*

0.36*

(0.16)

(0.16)

Previous contribution

2014

Model 2

-0.01

-0.01

(0.08)

(0.08)

0.53*

0.76**

0.53*

(0.22)

(0.25)

(0.23)

0.76**

1.05***

0.76**

(0.23)

(0.23)

(0.23)

0.17

0.18

0.17

(0.19)

(0.19)

(0.19)

0.00

0.00

0.00

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

0.25

0.33

0.25

(0.31)

(0.29)

(0.31)

-0.03

-0.04

-0.03

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.03)

-0.03

-0.04

-0.03

(0.19)

(0.25)

(0.20)

-0.03*

-0.05***

-0.03*

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

Note. Values are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in
parentheses. All analyses are restricted to contributions in 2013, 2014, and 2016, and to
individuals with a previous contribution in the sample year prior.
*

p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Discussion
While multiple theoretical models have been proposed to explain the evolution of
cooperation, there is little evidence on what theories actually explain cooperation in
evolutionarily-relevant settings. The Hadza provide an important test case for
evolutionary models of cooperation: Their daily life is marked by widespread sharing of
food, labor, and childcare. And their lifeways more closely approximate pre-Neolithic
populations compared to samples drawn from industrialized settings (Henrich et al.,
2010).
While nearly all models involve some behavioral flexibility such that an
individual’s level of cooperation is contingent on the social environment, most partner
choice models assume that individuals have fixed, often heritable, dispositions on which
the choice of partners is based (Aktipis, 2011; Eshel & Cavalli-Sforza, 1982; J. M.
McNamara et al., 2008; Noë & Hammerstein, 1994). In these models, individuals can
leave current partners or reject prospective partners based on their own personal
interactions with that partner or their observations of them. We find no evidence that
cooperative behavior persists over time – a condition that makes it difficult for observers
to make informed decisions on who to choose as partners.
Natural selection should favor individuals who select partners based on the
benefits their cooperative behavior generates, which is determined by both their partner’s
willingness and ability to cooperate (Barclay, 2016a). Whether willingness or ability to
cooperate is valued more as a criterion for partners will depend, in part, on which trait is
more variable in the population (Barclay & Raihani, 2016). In laboratory studies,
participants display a preference for partners who are willing to cooperate, possibly
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because cooperative contributions are artificially constrained. Conversely, the Hadza
have strong norms governing cooperation and sharing. If everyone shares because they
are expected to, then one’s ability to share may be valued more than their willingness to
share. In fact, when given the choice, the Hadza do not choose the most cooperative
individuals as campmates (Apicella et al., 2012). Instead, physical traits show small, but
positive correlations with how often individuals are chosen as campmates, possibly
because these traits indicate one’s ability to acquire resources (Apicella, 2014). Testing
whether the Hadza trade-off willingness to cooperate for other qualities would be an
interesting avenue for future study.
In a small sample of Tsimane' forager-horticulturalists (n = 12), generosity was
not shown to correlate over time (Gurven, 2014). Our findings, however, contrast with
laboratory studies using Western samples illustrating small-to-medium-sized correlations
in cooperative game play over time (Peysakhovich et al., 2014; Volk et al., 2012). The
discrepant results may also be due to the longer intervals between testing in our study.
Also, the Hadza are playing the game with different, but well-known, individuals each
year. In laboratory settings, individuals often play in the same anonymous or unfamiliar
group setting each time. However, when these individuals are assigned to cooperative or
non-cooperative environments, they adopt the dominant strategy and use the cooperator
or defector strategy at later times (Peysakhovich & Rand, 2015; Stagnaro, Arechar, &
Rand, 2017). Finally, cultural differences in dispositional consistency may also explain
the divergent results. Compared to individuals from collectivist societies, Westerners tend
to describe themselves in terms of underlying traits and have a stronger preference for
self-consistency (Heine, 2001).
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While we cannot isolate the exact mechanism(s) generating the within-group
homogeneity on cooperation, we find that cooperative behavior in any given year is best
predicted by the cooperativeness of one’s current residence group. The results are
consistent with social learning of local norms and reciprocity theories of cooperation that
assume people have reciprocal, conditional strategies. And the findings concur with
laboratory experiments demonstrating that cooperative and selfish play in economic
games influences others to behave similarly, leading to the spread of different
cooperative behaviors in the population (Fowler & Christakis, 2010; Jordan, Rand,
Arbesman, Fowler, & Christakis, 2013).
By using an economic game as our measure of cooperation, as opposed to
measuring naturally occurring levels of cooperation, we traded-off some ecological
validity for increased experimental control. We chose the public goods game due to its
direct relevance to hunter-gatherer life where collective action problems are a daily
occurrence. We observe that across years, the Hadza, on average, contribute 56% of their
endowment to the public goods, providing some reassurance that local institutions are
mapping onto game play.
It is difficult to establish the same degree of control in field settings that are found
in the laboratory. Thus, the problem of omitted variable bias is a concern as there may be
other influences on cooperation that were unobserved. For example, research in WEIRD
populations have found that incidental emotions resulting from weather (Hirshleifer &
Shumway, 2003), sex (Gabbi & Zanotti, 2019), and sporting outcomes (Otto, Fleming, &
Glimcher, 2016) influence economic decisions-making. It is possible that camps were
similarly experiencing different fortunes on the days in which cooperation was measured
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and this is the reason for clustering. This alternative is supported by the 2013 data in
which risk preferences were similarly clustered; however, the fact that cooperation
remained clustered after controlling for risk suggests this cannot entirely explain the
observed clustering. Future work would benefit from more in-depth examinations into
other factors that influence Hadza decisions to cooperate.
A third limitation of the study is that we collected data at discrete points far apart
in time and are limited by how much we can say about the formation and breakdown of
camps in relation to cooperation. Hunter-gatherer residence is determined by multiple and
complex demographic, ecological and personal factors (Apicella et al., 2012; Hill et al.,
2014). Examining the role of cooperation in Hadza camp formation and dissolution, as
well as examining how initial variation in levels of cooperation between individuals
converges on a stable equilibrium within a camp, are important areas for future
exploration.
Studying the conduits of norm establishment and reinforcement in huntergatherers hold particular promise. Storytelling, for instance, may be an effective way to
teach and establish norms (D. Smith et al., 2017), including norms of reciprocity.
Recently, it has been documented that among Agta foragers, groups with more skilled
storytellers are more cooperative (D. Smith et al., 2017). Moreover, there is a large
literature demonstrating how ritual activities, which are thought to enable the expression
of shared beliefs and norms, can impact cooperation and fairness (Sosis & Ruffle, 2003).
Hadza life is replete with public and private ritualistic activities – including song, dance,
meat-eating, storytelling and puberty initiation practices – which are thought to play an
important role in cementing relationships and promoting cooperation (Hill et al., 2014).
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Our findings challenge all evolutionary models of cooperation that assume fixed
social types. Consistent with models stressing the importance of contingent reciprocity,
cultural learning and social norms (Bowles & Gintis, 2004; Chudek & Henrich, 2011;
Gurven, 2006) we find that individuals’ cooperative behavior is best predicted by the
cooperativeness of their neighbors. The findings highlight the flexible nature of human
cooperation and the remarkable capacity of humans to respond adaptively to their social
environments.

33

CHAPTER 2: HADZA HUNTER-GATHERERS DISAGREE ON PERCEPTIONS
OF MORAL CHARACTER
To the extent that moral character is grounded in stable and observable truths, there
should exist agreement between people in their judgements of others’ character. In
Western populations, this agreement is found. We examine whether this is universal in
Hadza hunter-gatherers of Tanzania. Ninety-four judges ranked their campmates on
global character and relevant character traits for a total of 824 observations. Judges
disagreed on rankings of global character, generosity, and honesty, but agreed more on
hard work and hunting ability. Individual rankings on specific traits predicted character
evaluations. There was agreement between judges on the extent to which generosity and
hard work related to character. These findings suggest that Hadza have shared beliefs
about what traits constitute character, but disagree on which of their campmates exhibit
these traits. We discuss these findings in light of other research suggesting that stable
moral dispositions may not be universal.
Introduction
In Western societies, evaluation of moral character is an important component of
person perception (Goodwin, 2015; Goodwin, Piazza, & Rozin, 2014). When learning
about a new person, Italian undergraduates seek information about whether they are
trustworthy (Brambilla, Rusconi, Sacchi, & Cherubini, 2011). When identifying features
and traits most relevant to identity, online workers in the US consider morality to be an
essential component (Strohminger & Nichols, 2014). And when US undergraduates
consider what attributes a partner should have in different types of relationships, morally
relevant features, such as trustworthiness, are most important (Cottrell, Neuberg, & Li,
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2007). This makes sense because a person’s character is used to infer their intentions
toward us and whether they would help or hinder our goals (Landy et al., 2016). Indeed,
people use information about moral character to decide who to interact and cooperate
with (Everett et al., 2018; Martin & Cushman, 2015; van der Lee, Ellemers, Scheepers, &
Rutjens, 2017).
Despite the importance of moral character in person perception, some have argued
that character does not exist and that people do not have stable moral dispositions (Doris,
2002; Harman, 2003). Social psychologists and philosophers have used classic findings
from social psychology, such as the bystander effect (Darley & Latané, 1968; Latané &
Darley, 1968) or the good Samaritan experiment (Darley & Batson, 1973), to argue
against the existence of moral character and that moral behavior is determined wholly by
the situation (Doris, 2002; Harman, 2003). One way to determine whether people behave
similarly across situations is to examine agreement between independent observers.
Because different observers are likely to interact with the target in different situations, if
they agree in their evaluations, it then suggests there is a stable disposition that is being
observed (Kenrick & Funder, 1988). So, if independent observers have similar
perceptions of targets’ moral character, then it provides some evidence for the existence
of moral character.
People generally agree on who does, and does not, have moral character. In a US
community sample, self-report and informant ratings of morally-relevant traits, such as
honesty or guilt-proneness, moderately correlate (Cohen, Panter, Turan, Morse, & Kim,
2013). Independent observers in US community samples also agree on global evaluations
of moral character, as well as specific moral traits and trait profiles. (Helzer et al., 2014).
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And online workers in the US agree on morally relevant traits displayed by respected
cultural figures, even across the US political divide (Frimer, Biesanz, Walker, &
MacKinlay, 2013). Again, this agreement is used as evidence that moral character exists.
Like much of behavioral and social science research, samples in studies of moral
psychology have largely been drawn from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and
Democratic—or WEIRD—societies (Ellemers, van der Toorn, Paunov, & van Leeuwen,
2019; Henrich et al., 2010). Despite this, the importance of moral character in identity
and person perception is theorized to be universal (Strohminger, Knobe, & Newman,
2017). Most often, when moral psychology is examined in other cultures, the emphasis is
on the content of moral norms and the shared or unique prescriptions and prohibitions
across cultures (Curry, Mullins, & Whitehouse, 2019; Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993;
Purzycki et al., 2018). Yet, when research has looked at processes in moral judgments,
important differences have been found. For example, whether a wrong is done
intentionally is an important distinction in moral judgments among Western populations,
presumably because it reveals information about moral character (Landy & Uhlmann,
2018). However, unintentional violations are judged as wrong as intentional violations in
some cultures, including the Hadza and South Pacific islanders (Barrett et al., 2016; R. A.
McNamara, Willard, Norenzayan, & Henrich, 2019). To our knowledge, no research has
been conducted on perceptions of moral character in small-scale societies.
There are reasons to suspect important differences in moral character and its
perception in small-scale societies. First, there is some evidence for less personality
variation in non-WEIRD societies. For example, personality traits in the Tsimané
forager-horticulturalists of Bolivia do not cluster into five distinct factors, but rather two,
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and there is less variation within those factors compared to Western samples (Gurven,
von Rueden, Massenkoff, Kaplan, & Vie, 2013). And in fact, across 55 nations,
populations with fewer economic opportunities to specialize have less variation in
personality traits (Lukaszewski, Gurven, von Rueden, & Schmitt, 2017). To the extent
that there is a relationship between personality traits and moral character (Thalmayer,
Saucier, Srivastava, Flournoy, & Costello, 2019), we might then similarly expect less
variation in morally-relevant character traits. Second, there is no evidence for generous
dispositions in small-scale societies. In longitudinal data among the Hadza, contributions
to a public good game were not predicted by previous contributions, but rather the
contributions of an individual’s campmates (K. M. Smith, Larroucau, Mabulla, &
Apicella, 2018). Here, strong, local norms governing generosity may be reducing
individual variation in morally-relevant behavior leading to a lack of agreement on
perceptions of moral character.
In the current study, we examine perceptions of moral character among the Hadza
of Tanzania, one of the last remaining hunter-gatherer groups in the world. The Hadza are
an ideal population because they live in small groups of known individuals where
behavior is observable, and because of their harsh environment, knowing who is moral
would be seemingly important. We examine agreement on these perceptions in two ways.
First, do Hadza agree on who has moral character? And second, do Hadza agree on what
traits contribute to global moral character? To answer these questions, we ask the Hadza
to rank their campmates on moral character, as well as specific traits of hard work,
generosity, and honesty. We examine the consensus within each camp on rank orderings
for each trait to answer the first question. We examine the relationship between the
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specific traits and global character rankings and the variation between Hadza on the
importance of the specific traits in determining global character to answer the second
question.
Method
Population
The Hadza are a group of nomadic hunter-gatherers living in rural north Tanzania
around Lake Eyasi. There are about 300 Hadza who still practice a foraging lifestyle
(Marlowe, 2010). The Hadza have a sexual division of labor; men hunt for game, such as
giraffe, impala, or zebra, and collect honey, while women gather plant items, such as
tubers and berries. Food brought back to the camp that requires extended processing,
such as meat and tubers, are distributed across the entire camp. Food and fresh water is
scarce; about 80% of Hadza report concerns about whether there will be enough food in
the next month (Apicella, 2018). Other threats to Hadza include high rates of disease and
infection, and less commonly, attacks from predators, such as lions, hyenas, leopards, and
snakes. Approximately 40% of children born will not live to reach the age of five
(Blurton-Jones, 2016).
The Hadza live in temporary camps of about 30 adults and children, usually
consisting of two to three unrelated nuclear families. The Hadza a have multilocal
residence pattern—men and women are equally likely to live with kin, though the
average genetic relatedness for both sexes within camps is low (Blurton-Jones, 2016; Hill
et al., 2011). Camps move location every 4 to 6 weeks as local resources are depleted,
and people frequently join new camps as they please. Repeat interaction rates are low in
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the Hadza (Hill et al., 2014), and from year-to-year, individuals are only living with about
20% of their previous campmates (K. M. Smith et al., 2018).
Though the Hadza have strong norms of food sharing, they do try to cheat these
norms when possible. In economic games that measure rule-bending, Hadza will cheat to
benefit themselves at the expense of their campmates (Apicella, 2018). Anecdotally,
Hadza will sometimes try to bring in meat under the cover of darkness to avoid sharing
with others and will sometimes even ask to hide carcasses under a researcher’s vehicle
(Marlowe, 2010). Hadza historically have little experience with centralized institutions
involving punishment (e.g., police and courts). In economic games, the Hadza have lowrates of second- and third-party punishment (Henrich, 2006). And though most Hadza
report believing in god (Haine or sometimes Ishoko), few attribute to Haine moralistic
concerns or the power to detect and punish norm violations (Apicella, 2018). Thus, there
are opportunities for the Hadza to show variation in moral behavior and for others to
witness it, though observed deviations may not be punished.
Sample
The first author and research assistants visited 12 camps1 during the dry-season in
August-September 2016 using a snowball sampling procedure; after visiting one camp,
members of that camp would direct us toward the nearest camp. We collected data until
we could not identify any more camps. The number of adults in each camp ranged from
three to twelve. We interviewed 94 judges who ranked 95 subjects (one participant left

1

We collected data from a thirteenth camp that had 36 adults; judges found the task of ranking this many
people arduous. We had judges in this camp rank the top twelve campmates on each trait instead. However,
the analyses used here require people to be ranking the same set of participants, so we did not use these
data. Data for this camp were never entered or analyzed.
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camp after his photo was taken but before he was interviewed) for a total of N = 824
observations. Two judges (n = 20 observations) were removed because they refused to
rank their campmates on honesty, stating that everyone in their camp is a liar. Another
two observations were removed because of an error in recording the data. The final
sample included 95 subjects (n = 46 men, mean age M = 39.8 years-old, n = 68 married)
ranked by 92 judges for n = 802 observations.
Procedure
We asked judges to rank their campmates on generosity (“Who shares the most
food?”), hard work or effort (“Who works the hardest to get food?”), honesty (“Who tells
the fewest lies?”), and global moral character (“Who has the best heart?”). We asked
about generosity, hard work, and honesty because in previous research when Hadza are
asked to free list traits that make a good person these were some of the nominated traits
(Purzycki et al., 2018). We used “good heart” as a global character judgment because this
was the most common response in the free list task and the Hadza seem to equate good
heart with being a good person. We also asked them to rank men on who is the best
hunter (“Who is the best hunter?”), and which we include as a non-moral comparison.
Finally, we asked them who they prefer as campmates, but do not include that data here.
To have judges rank their campmates, we took headshot photographs of all the
consenting adults in a camp using a Fujifilm Instax Mini 90 Classic Instant Film Camera
which printed 1.8 × 2.4 inch images. We then conducted private interviews in Swahili
with each adult. A research assistant would shuffle the photographs and lay them in front
of the judge. The assistant would then ask the judge, “Who shares the most food?” After
the judge picked a photograph, the assistant would remove the photograph, shuffle the
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remaining photographs, and repeat the question. This was repeated until all campmates
were ranked on that trait. The entire process was then repeated for each trait. The Hadza
have previously done this task multiple times to rank campmates on hunting ability
(Apicella, 2014; K. M. Smith, Olkhov, Puts, & Apicella, 2017; Stibbard-Hawkes,
Attenborough, & Marlowe, 2018).
Analysis
We used Bayesian regression models for inferential analyses. Bayesian analyses
compute the probability the observed data are generated by a hypothesized parameter
value, conditional on the model assumptions and prior probabilities (Kruschke & Liddell,
2018a; McElreath, 2016). This produces a distribution of probability values across a
range of possible parameter values. This allows us to describe the estimated strength of
the relationship and the uncertainty around the estimate, rather than focusing on point
hypothesis testing (Kruschke & Liddell, 2018b). In our analyses we use weakly
regularizing priors; these are conservative priors that are skeptical of large associations
and that restrict the estimates to more plausible values (McElreath, 2016).
We analyzed the data in R (R, 2017) using the ‘rjags’ (Plummer, 2018) and
‘brms’ (Bürkner, 2017) packages. Both packages use Monte Carlo Markov Chains to
draw samples from the posterior distributions, drawing more samples from regions with
higher probabilities to estimate the posterior distribution; the packages use different
algorithms to explore the distribution. We also used the ‘tidyverse’ (Wickham, 2017b),
‘tidybayes’ (Kay, 2018), ‘ggridges’ (Wilke, 2018), and ‘irr’ (Gamer, Lemon, & Fellows,
2012) packages.
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Results
Do Hadza agree on who is moral?
We examined the extent to which Hadza agree on the ranking of each trait by
computing a Kendall’s W for each trait for each camp. Kendall’s W is a coefficient of
consensus for ranking data, and it has a range of zero to one, with zero indicating no
agreement between raters and one indicating complete agreement (Zar, 1996). A
suggested benchmark for Kendall’s W is that 0.5 indicates moderate agreement and 0.3
indicates weak agreement. The observed values are presented in Figure 2.1. The median
value for good heart was 0.19 and ranged from 0.04 to 0.31, the median value for effort
was 0.25 and ranged from 0.07 to 0.60, the median value for generosity was 0.19 and
ranged from 0.00 to 0.48, the median value for honesty was 0.19 and ranged from 0.10 to
0.44, and the median value for hunting ability was 0.40 and ranged from 0.16 to 0.63.
The median values for effort, generosity, honesty, and good heart all fall below the
suggested benchmark for weak agreement.
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Figure 2.1. Kendall’s W for each trait for each camp with boxplots. The points represent
observed values, the size of the points represent the number of subjects ranked, and the
color indicates camp. The light dashed line is at 0.5, which is suggested as moderate
agreement, and the heavy dashed line is at 0.3, which is suggested as weak agreement.
Two camps had only one man and were not included in the calculation for ranking on
hunting ability.

For inferential analyses, we used a transformed value of Kendall’s W. A
transformed Kendall’s W has a chi-square distribution such that 𝑚(𝑘 − 1)𝑊~𝛸 2 (𝑘 −
1, 𝜆), where m is the number of judges, k is the number of items being ranked, and λ is
the non-centrality parameter (Zar, 1996). This allows us to estimate a population-wide
level of agreement within each camp; the estimated values were then be used to simulate
statistics describing the level of agreement. We fit a linear regression model with a non43

central chi-square distribution likelihood estimating λ given the transformed W’s for each
trait and camp and the number of subjects ranked. We included random intercepts for
camps, and dummy-coded the traits relative to the good heart rankings. To fit the model,
we used ‘rjags’ (Plummer, 2018) with four chains; the chains had 10,000 iterations burnin and each chain sampled 5,000 iterations from the posterior distribution for a total of
20,000 samples.
Table 2.1. Estimated Non-centrality Parameter and Simulated Kendall’s W for each
Trait
Trait

λ

W (m = 6)

Heart

2.19 [0.94, 3.74]

0.24 [0.20, 0.29]

0.16 [0.14, 0.19] 0.12 [0.11, 0.14]

Honesty

1.70 [0.63, 4.12]

0.24 [0.19, 0.31]

0.16 [0.14, 0.20] 0.12 [0.11, 0.15]

Generosity

1.31 [0.41, 3.04]

0.21 [0.18, 0.27]

0.15 [0.13, 0.18] 0.12 [0.10, 0.13]

Effort

3.85 [1.62, 7.35]

0.30 [0.22, 0.41]

0.19 [0.15, 0.25] 0.14 [0.12, 0.18]

Hunt

5.07 [2.13, 8.83]

0.58 [0.36, 0.90] 0.33 [0.21, 0.48]

W (m = 8)

W (m = 10)

0.22 [0.15, 0.31]

Note. Values are modal values from the posterior with 90% HDI intervals in brackets. λ is
the estimated non-centrality parameter. W values are simulated from the non-centrality
parameter for a camp with m judges. For all traits but hunting, there are k = m subjects;
for hunting, k = m/2.

Table 2.1 presents the estimated non-centrality parameter for each trait. From
these non-centrality parameters, we simulated Kendall’s W’s for each trait; because W is
dependent on the number of judges and people being ranked, we simulated W for a small
(m = 6), medium (m = 8), and large (m = 10) camp. For all the good heart, generosity, and
honesty, even in the small camp, the simulated values fell below the 0.30 value for weak
agreement, whereas for effort the values in small camps were near this benchmark and
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for hunting ability the values in the small camp were above the benchmark for moderate
agreement (0.50). In larger camps, the estimated W for every trait falls below 0.30, except
for hunting ability, which in medium camps still falls above that benchmark. We also
directly compared the estimated non-centrality parameters between each trait (see Table
2.2) to compare agreement holding camp size constant; Hadza agreed more on rankings
of hunting ability and effort than they did on rankings of good heart, generosity, and
honesty.
Table 2.2. Comparisons of Estimated Non-centrality Parameters Between each Trait
Heart
Heart

Honesty

Generosity

Effort

Hunt

0.52

0.80

0.05

0.01

0.73

0.09

0.02

0.02

0.00

Honesty

0.49

Generosity

0.20

0.27

Effort

0.95

0.92

0.98

Hunt

1.00

0.99

1.00

0.25
0.75

Note. Values are proportions of posterior in which λ for the trait in the row is greater than
the λ for the trait in the column.

We converted the simulated W values to r such that 𝑟 =

𝑚𝑊−1
𝑚−1

; r is the mean

Spearman’s ρ between each possible pair of judges (Zar, 1996), or the expected
agreement between pairs of judges. In a medium sized (m = 8) camp, the modal simulated
r value for good heart r = 0.04 [90% HDI: 0.02, 0.08], for honesty r = 0.04 [90% HDI:
0.02, 0.09], for generosity r = 0.03 [90% HDI: 0.01, 0.06], for effort r = 0.08 [90% HDI:
0.03, 0.15], and for hunting r = 0.23 [90% HDI: 0.10, 0.41]. Figure 2.2 presents the
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distribution of simulated r values for each trait for each small, medium, and large camps.
These values indicate that judges disagree on their rankings of campmates’ character.

Figure 2.2. Simulated r values from the estimated non-centrality parameter for each trait.
For heart, honesty, generosity, and effort, the number of judges and the number of
subjects being ranked are equal to camp size; for hunting, the number of subjects being
ranked is half the camp size.

Do Hadza agree on what makes someone moral?
To examine which traits Hadza consider important to moral character, we fit an
ordered logistic model regressing rankings of good heart on rankings of effort,
generosity, and honesty, as well as the subject’s sex, age (z-scored), marital status, and
the relationship between judge and subject (i.e., self, spouse, kin, or none). Character
rankings were centered within each camp such that rank changes are relative to the camp
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median. We include random intercepts for camp and subject, random slopes for camp and
judge for every effect, and random slopes for subject for the effects of character rankings
and the relationship between judge and subject. We fit the model using ‘brms’ (Bürkner,
2017), which implements Stan (Carpenter et al., 2017) to estimate the posterior. We used
one chain with 20,000 iterations, the first 10,000 iterations were warm-up, with a step
parameter of δ = 0.95.
Population-level effects
We first examined the population-level effects. Table 2.3 presents the coefficients
for all variables in the model. There was strong evidence that higher rankings on effort
and generosity were related to higher rankings on good heart, while there was suggestive
evidence that higher rankings on honesty were related to higher rankings on good heart.
There was some evidence that older Hadza had higher rankings on good heart, otherwise
demographic variables did not relate to rankings on good heart. We simulated rankings of
good heart as a function of rankings on effort, generosity, and honesty in the largest camp
(n = 12) and computed the expected difference in good heart ranking between the highest
and lowest ranked person on each trait. The modal difference for effort was 3.2 (90%
HDI: 1.9, 4.4) ranks, for generosity 1.7 (90% HDI: 0.2, 3.0) ranks, and for honesty 0.9
(90% HDI: -0.3, 2.6) ranks. Figure 2.3 presents the full range of simulated rankings.
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Table 2.3. Model Regressing Good Heart Ranking on Character Rankings and
Subject Demographics
Coefficient

b

90% HDI

%>0

Effort

0.24

0.13 – 0.35

100

Generosity

0.13

0.02 – 0.24

97.2

Honesty

0.08

-0.04 – 0.20

88.1

Female

0.21

-1.37 – 1.62

54.3

Married

0.29

-0.31 – 0.73

76.5

Age

0.22

-0.13 – 0.54

85.4

Spouse

0.32

-0.38 – 1.22

79.1

Kin

0.34

-0.39 – 1.02

78.4

Self

0.00

-0.87 – 1.06

56.1

Note. The coefficient estimate is the mode of the posterior distribution. The 90% highest
posterior density interval (HDI) is the narrowest interval containing 90% of the posterior,
or the 90% most plausible coefficient estimates. The last column is the percent of the
posterior greater than zero.
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Figure 2.3. Ranking on good heart by ranking on each character trait, centered within
camp. Predictions were simulated by generating 10,000 values from an ordered logistic
distribution for each ranking and the mean of these generated values were predicted
ranking. The line is the modal simulated value and the shaded region is the 90% credible
interval.

Judge-level effects
To determine whether judges agreed on how much the specific traits contributed
to an individual’s global character, we examined variation between judges on the
relationship between character rankings and good heart rankings. First, we fit a series of
eight models including varying slopes for judges for none, one, two, or all of the
character traits; the eight models were otherwise identical. This allowed us to examine
whether including extra parameters to estimate varying slopes for judges was worth the
improved fit. Table 2.4 presents fit statistics for these models, including the Akaike
weight. The Akaike weight is the probability that a model would best predict a new
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sample of data compared to all the other models under consideration (McElreath, 2016).
The Akaike weight is distributed across most of the models. Models including random
slopes for effort had 0.35 of the weight, models including random slopes for generosity
had 0.54 of the weight, and random slopes for models including honesty had 0.95 of the
weight; this indicates that the model most likely to best estimate the data is likely to
include disagreement between judges on the contribution of honesty to good heart, and is
less likely to include disagreement on the contribution of effort and generosity to good
heart.there is good evidence for disagreement between judges on the contribution of
honesty to good heart, and less evidence for disagreement on generosity and effort.
Rather than selecting one model as the best fitting, we constructed a weighted-average
posterior using the Akaike weights (McElreath, 2016) and examined the variation
between judges using that posterior.
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Table 2.4. Fit of Models Regressing Good Hearts Rankings on Character Rankings
Model

WAIC

SEWAIC

pWAIC

Akaike weight

Baseline

1760.77

29.80

100.90

0.02

Effort

1761.11

29.61

107.82

0.01

Generosity

1761.14

29.58

113.17

0.01

Honesty

1754.80

31.13

123.21

0.30

Effort + Generosity

1761.29

29.50

118.45

0.01

Effort + Honesty

1756.49

30.99

128.09

0.13

Generosity + Honesty

1754.68

30.99

139.14

0.32

Full

1755.60

31.03

142.67

0.20

Note. Model names refer to what character traits in the model had random slopes for
judges. WAIC is the widely-applicable information criterion estimate; a lower number
indicates a better fitting model. SEWAIC is the standard error of the WAIC estimate, pWAIC
is the effective number of parameters in the model, and the Akaike weight is computed
from WAIC and is the probability that the model will best predict a new set of data
among the considered models.
In the weighted-average posterior, the modal σJudge of varying slopes for effort
was 0.00 (90% HDI: 0, 0.13), for generosity 0.00 (90% HDI: 0.00, 0.26), and for honesty
0.24 (90% HDI: 0.09, 0.38). We also compared the σJudge to the population coefficient;
the percent of the posterior for which the σJudge was greater than the population coefficient
for effort was 2.0%, for generosity 40.2%, and for honesty 88.8%; there was good
evidence that knowing a particular judge’s belief of the role of honesty in character
provided more information than knowing the population’s belief, but this was not the
case for effort and generosity. Finally, as another way to examine consensus, we
computed the expected proportion of judges to have a negative slope between rankings
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on each trait and rankings on good heart. The modal expected proportion of negative
slopes for effort was 0.00 (90% HDI: 0.00, 0.04), for generosity 0.00 (90% HDI: 0.00,
0.38), and for honesty 0.38 (90% HDI: 0.00, 0.51). Again, for honesty, even though at the
population level more honest Hadza were ranked higher on good heart, a number of
judges ranked more honest Hadza lower on good heart. Figure 2.4 presents at the mean of
the posterior the simulated variation between judges across rankings.

Figure 2.4. Ranking on good heart by ranking on each character trait, centered within
camp. Predictions were simulated by generating 10,000 values from an ordered logistic
distribution for each ranking and the mean of these generated values were predicted
ranking. Each line is a simulated judge’s slope taken from the mean of weighted-average
posterior.

Discussion
In WEIRD societies, people evaluate the moral character of others and use those
perceptions to decide with whom to interact. Underscoring the importance of character in
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these populations, independent observers agree on how moral others are (Helzer et al.,
2014). But is this universal? To answer this, we asked if Hadza hunter-gatherers agree on
who is moral and what traits make someone moral. The Hadza disagree on which of their
campmates have a good heart, are generous, and are honest, and agree more on which
campmates are hard working (effort) and produce the most food (hunting ability). At the
level of the population, hard work, generosity, and honesty contribute to global character;
however, there is variation between Hadza judges on how much honesty contributes to
global character, though judges agree more on how much hard work and generosity
contribute to character. Overall, these results suggest that Hadza use some of the same
criteria—hard work and generosity—for evaluating moral character, but disagree on who
displays those traits, leading to disagreement on global character perceptions.
Agreement between independent observers on ratings about a trait is taken as
evidence for that trait existing because raters are likely observing the same behaviors
despite being in different situations (Kenrick & Funder, 1988). The disagreement
between Hadza judges on character traits suggests that Hadza may have little stable
variation in moral dispositions.2 However, disagreement does not definitively rule out the
existence of moral character. For example, the Hadza may have been unwilling to make
assessments about their campmates’ character, though notably we do see agreement on
hunting ability, which is highly valued in the Hadza. Or there could be disagreement
because there are not many opportunities to display moral behavior; however, it should
be easy to observe moral behavior because they live together in small groups and depend

2

To be clear, the claim is not that the Hadza are not moral or that morality is not important to them. Rather,
the claim is that individuals’ moral behavior varies across time, changing to adapt to local circumstances.
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on each other for survival. Finally, another alternative is that Hadza display consistent
moral behavior to specific people; that is, a person could always be generous to one
campmate and selfish to another campmate, leading to disagreement between campmates
in evaluations of moral character. Future research exploring the stability of judge-subject
rankings across time could address this alternative interpretation.
One alternative interpretation of the data is that the Hadza can agree on moral
character, and in fact they do have moral dispositions, but that our measure is unreliable
and cannot detect agreement. A good measure measuring a phenomenon that does not
exist and a bad measure measuring a phenomenon that does exist will produce the same
result: noise. However, we argue there are two reasons to suspect that our measure would
be reliable enough to detect agreement on moral character if it existed. First, we were
able to detect moderate relationships between the specific character traits and moral
character, indicating reliability was not so low as to be unable to detect any effects.
Second, we did find moderate agreement on hard work and hunting ability. And in fact,
given what we know about the noisy relationship between hunting returns and hunting
reputation (Stibbard-Hawkes et al., 2018), the fact that we were able to detect agreement
suggests low reliability can not fully explain the disagreement in perceptions of moral
character.
It may seem that hunting ability would be easily observable, but in the
anthropological literature, this is notoriously difficult to measure, and because of this
hunting reputation is criticized as a measure of hunting success (Hill & Kintigh, 2009).
First, hunting ability is rarely directly observed, as most hunting happens alone. And
second, there is high variance in hunting returns, in which men return to camp with
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nothing on most days, but occasionally (about 3% of days) bring in large game (Hawkes,
O’Connell, & Blurton-Jones, 1991). In fact, for anthropologists to reliably estimate
hunting ability using hunting returns, they need 200 to 600 days of observations (Hill &
Kintigh, 2009). Despite this, in our study and others (Stibbard-Hawkes et al., 2018), the
Hadza are able to agree on who the best hunters are, and hunting reputation does relate to
proxies of actual hunting ability, such as strength, accuracy, and ecological knowledge
(Apicella, 2014; Stibbard-Hawkes et al., 2018). This suggests that if there are moral
dispositions among the Hadza, the signal is much weaker than that of hunting ability,
which is itself a noisy signal (Stibbard-Hawkes, 2019). If it is this hard to detect moral
dispositions, it then raises the question of whether the Hadza can reliably determine
character enough to provide useful social information.
Data measuring morally-relevant behavior, such as generosity, further suggest a
stable variation in lack of moral dispositions in the Hadza and other non-WEIRD
populations. In a longitudinal study, a Hadza’s previous generosity in an economic game
did not predict their subsequent contributions, and instead the only significant predictor
was how much his or her campmates contribute (K. M. Smith et al., 2018). And in a
small study (n = 12) of the Tsimané of Bolivia, generosity in a dictator game in one year
did not predict generosity in a later year (Gurven, 2014).
These results further support recent research finding that character and moral
reputation do not play a role in Hadza campmate preferences. When asked who they
prefer to live with, Hadza do not choose the most generous people, whether generosity is
measured using an economic game (Apicella et al., 2012) or via reputation (K. M. Smith
& Apicella, 2019). Rather, Hadza prefer to live with better hunters (K. M. Smith &
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Apicella, 2019; Wood, 2006). If moral behavior changes across time and situations as our
results here suggest, then choosing campmates based on their current behavior is useless.
Instead, traits related to productivity, such as being a hard worker or a good hunter, may
become more important in campmate preferences (Barclay, 2016b); if everyone is
expected to share because of strong norms, such as in the Hadza, then choosing
productive campmates is more important. And in fact, a preference for productive
partners may influence friendships in Western societies. US undergraduates and online
workers prefer partners in economic games and are more generous to partners who are
perceived to be more productive, even though it is irrelevant to the game (Eisenbruch,
Grillot, Maestripieri, & Roney, 2016; Eisenbruch & Roney, 2017). The effect of a
productivity preference in various relationships may be a fruitful area for future research.
Throughout the latter half of the 20th century, the situationist paradigm in social
psychology casted doubt on the existence of moral character. However, more recent
research in moral psychology has argued that moral character does in fact exist (Fleeson,
Furr, Jayawickreme, Meindl, & Helzer, 2014). In Western societies, people agree on who
is moral (Helzer et al., 2014), and perceptions of moral character play an important role
in social cognition (Goodwin, 2015; Landy & Uhlmann, 2018). Our results here question
the universality of moral character and its centrality in social life, and highlights the
importance of cross-cultural research using underrepresented samples. By conducting
research with populations in a variety of socio-ecologies, we can better understand the
variation in our moral psychology.
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CHAPTER 3: PARNTER CHOICE IN HUMAN EVOLUTION: THE ROLE OF
CHARACTER, HUNTING ABILITY, AND RECIPROCITY IN HADZA
CAMPMATE SELECTION
The ability to choose the partners we interact with is thought to have been an important
driver in the evolution of human social behavior, and in particular, for our propensity to
cooperate. But evidence for this claim comes largely from Western populations. Here, we
investigate qualities associated with being a preferred partner (i.e. campmate) in Hadza
hunter-gatherers of northern Tanzania. Ninety-two Hadza participants from 12 camps
ranked their current campmates on character traits (i.e. hard work, generosity, and
honesty), hunting ability in men, and their preference for them as future campmates. We
found positive but weak associations between rankings on character traits and being a
preferred campmate. However, there was suggestive evidence that being perceived as a
better hunter was a more important criterion than any character traits for being a preferred
campmate in men. And we found little evidence to suggest that partner preferences were
reciprocated among campmates. Finally, we found little evidence to suggest that being a
preferred campmate is associated with greater reproductive success, which suggests there
is little benefit to being a valued partner. Together, these findings suggest that social
selection for character traits was not a powerful driving force in the evolution of human
cooperation.
Introduction
Living in groups can offer many benefits to animals. Group living offers
protection from predators, access to mates, opportunities for collaborative foraging, and
the potential exchange of resources, among other benefits. However, social living
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introduces competition to gain access to partners that provide the most benefits. If the
most valuable partners can choose who to share their benefits with, and they in turn want
the most valuable partners they can access, then partners that offer the most benefits are a
valuable resource to compete over. This is commonly observed in the context of mate
choice, where the most prized males and females will pair (Buston & Emlen, 2003), often
resulting in the sexual selection of traits that provide an advantage over same-sex
competitors. However, sexual selection is a form of social selection (Lyon &
Montgomerie, 2012; West-Eberhard, 1983), and social animals can compete for access to
valuable partners in a number of domains, leading to the evolution of costly
morphological and behavioral traits.
Social selection may have been especially important in human evolution, and in
particular, the evolution of cooperation (Barclay, 2016a; Baumard et al., 2013; Tooby &
Cosmides, 1996). While mutual cooperation can benefit both partners, cooperation risks
costly exploitation. However, if people have the option to leave exploitative social
partners for more cooperative ones, then cooperation can be a stable strategy (Aktipis,
2011; Rand, Arbesman, & Christakis, 2011). Because valuable cooperative partners have
the option to leave and pick other valued partners, people must compete for access to the
most cooperative people. And the best way to compete for a valuable partner is to also be
a valuable partner.
Valuable social partners are those that can provide the most benefits to their
partners. The benefit potential partners provide is the function of two values: their
willingness and their ability to confer benefits (Barclay, 2013, 2016a). A skilled but
stingy partner is able to generate benefits but does not share them, and a generous but
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incompetent partner may share but fail to generate any benefits to be shared. As such,
people are expected to independently track reputations in each domain. And in fact,
Dominican laborers who depend on their neighbors for assistance in producing bay oil,
do track willingness and ability separately (Macfarlan & Lyle, 2015). The value placed
on generosity or competence also depends on the variation in available partners along
these dimensions (Barclay, 2016b). For example, if potential partners are all similarly
generous, then competence becomes more valued than generosity. Thus, willingness and
ability to confer benefits, that is, character or competence, are expected to be important
traits in partner selection.
There is considerable evidence across populations that people prefer to interact
with people who are generous and cooperative. In the US, when considering the ideal
partner for a variety of relationships, people identify cooperative traits, such as
trustworthiness and fairness, as being important (Cottrell et al., 2007; Goodwin et al.,
2014; Landy et al., 2016). When being observed, people will compete to be chosen as
partners by being more cooperative, and cooperative people are in fact chosen more often
as social partners (Barclay & Willer, 2007; Sylwester & Roberts, 2010). Among
Dominican horticulturalists and Quechuan agropastoralists, people who have cooperative
reputations have more social ties (Lyle & Smith, 2014; Macfarlan, Quinlan, & Remiker,
2013; Macfarlan, Remiker, & Quinlan, 2012). And when the Martu foragers of Australia
select hunting partners, they prefer to hunt with people who share more food, regardless
of their actual hunting ability (Bliege Bird & Power, 2015; Bliege Bird, Scelza, Bird, &
Smith, 2012). Across a number of societies, people preferentially interact with and help
people perceived to have high character.
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Less attention has been paid to the role of ability and productivity in preference
for social partners, though some evidence exists that people prefer productive partners.
For example, US participants prefer to continue relationships with productive partners,
especially when productivity is indicative of future ability to generate benefits
(Eisenbruch & Roney, 2017). Even partners who are simply perceived to be more
productive are preferred more as social partners (Eisenbruch et al., 2016). However,
when choosing between generous or productive partners, people prioritize generosity
partners (Eisenbruch & Roney, 2017; Raihani & Barclay, 2016). And in several nonWestern societies, productive people receive a number of social benefits. For example,
among Aché forager-horticulturalists, productive hunters receive more food transfers
when sick than less productive hunters (Gurven, Allen-Arave, Hill, & Hurtado, 2000). In
Dominican and Peruvian villages, people with reputations for being productive have
more cooperative relationships (Macfarlan & Lyle, 2015). And in Hadza huntergatherers, both men and women prefer good gatherers and hunters, respectively, as mates
(Marlowe, 2004b). These results suggest that selection for productivity may have also
been important in the evolution of human partner choice.
The competition to gain access to valuable partners in some partner choice models
can create a biological market, where there is agreement on who is most valued and the
most valued partners can demand other valued partners (Noë & Hammerstein, 1994). One
important assumption is that there are benefits to being a desired partner. This affords
more social opportunities, which could lead to greater access to resources, including
food, coalitionary support in conflicts, and assistance when ill or injured, all of which
could ultimately result in greater reproductive success. For example, being a good hunter
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can lead directly to greater reproductive success by attaining more food, but being a good
hunter can also indirectly lead to greater reproductive success because of better social
partners that provide other benefits. For example, in the Agta and BaYaka foragers
(Chaudhary et al., 2016; Page et al., 2017), people with more social ties receive more
help, more food transfers, and have greater reproductive success.
Alternatively, rather than competing to be valued by everyone, people may
compete to be valued by a few select partners; specifically, those partners who value
them above others. That is, people can form friendships (Hruschka, 2010; Tooby &
Cosmides, 1996). Whereas the biological market strategy is to be popular and valued by
many, the friendship strategy is to be selective and discriminating with whom one
interacts. Here, you would expect partners to reciprocate friendships. Consistent with
this, among US college and online samples, people reciprocate friendship rankings
among their best friends (DeScioli & Kurzban, 2009; DeScioli, Kurzban, Koch, & LibenNowell, 2011). In the context of cooperation, cooperation can evolve when people seek
out partners who cooperate specifically with them, even if they are uncooperative in
general (Hruschka & Henrich, 2006). Thus, rather than preferring the most cooperative
partners, friendship models predict that people should prefer partners who are specifically
generous to them. In US samples, people more harshly judge a friend who is not generous
to them but is generous to someone else compared to a friend who is not generous to
anyone, including them (Barakzai & Shaw, 2018). And among Agta hunter-gatherers,
people are more likely to share with people who share with them specifically rather than
the most generous person (Daniel Smith et al., 2018). These studies suggest that
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friendship pays off because it gives access to partners that value and invest in you
specifically, rather than providing benefits promiscuously.
The reviewed literature suggests that social selection and our ability to choose
who to interact may have played an important role in the evolution of human cooperation.
To compete for access to valuable cooperative partners, people must themselves be
valuable partners. Partners can be valuable because they are willing to share benefits, are
able to generate benefits, or because they reciprocate benefits to their partners
specifically. Previous research provides evidence for partner choice for each of these
ways. However, this research has been largely conducted in Western populations
(Henrich et al., 2010) and in contexts not ecologically relevant for the evolution of human
cooperation. Moreover, past studies do not consider all three types of value within a
single study.
In the current study, we examine the role of character, productivity, and
reciprocity in partner choice among Hadza hunter-gatherers, whose way of life more
closely approximates life before the advent of agriculture (Apicella & Barrett, 2016;
Marlowe, 2005). In previous research using a behavioral measure of cooperation (i.e.,
one-shot public good game), cooperation did not seem to be an important criterion for
choosing potential campmates among the Hadza. Hadza who contributed more in the
public good game were not more likely to be nominated as potential campmates (Apicella
et al., 2012). Moreover, Hadza who contributed more to the public good in a previous
year did not live with more cooperative campmates in a future year (K. M. Smith et al.,
2018). And there also does not seem to a benefit to being a valued campmate; Hadza who
were more often nominated as potential campmates did not have greater reproductive
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success (Apicella et al., 2012). This set of findings are inconsistent with predictions from
models of partner choice based on cooperation within a biological market. Instead,
research suggests that Hadza prefer people with whom they have a ritual relationship
(Hill et al., 2014). And preferences for future campmates are reciprocated within samesex networks (Apicella et al., 2012). These latter findings lend some preliminary support
to friendship models of cooperation (Hruschka, 2010; Tooby & Cosmides, 1996).
There are a number of possibilities why previous research on Hadza campmate
preferences failed to find a preference for cooperators. A possibility is that the economic
game used does not reliably capture reputation as a cooperator. One reason could be
because the game measures one narrow domain of cooperation among many in Hadza
life, such as food sharing, childcare, and protection (Apicella & Crittenden, 2016).
Another reason is that nominations included cross-camp networks and Hadza may not
have up-to-date information about potential campmates’ cooperativeness, possibly
because behavior changes faster than reputation spreads (Macfarlan et al., 2013). To
address this concern, here we use informant rankings to measure perceptions of their
campmates’ character, hunting ability (in men), and their preference for them as future
campmates. We use these data to answer the following questions:
1.

Do Hadza prefer campmates who they rank higher on character traits?

2.

Do Hadza prefer male campmates who they rank higher on character traits

or hunting reputation?
3.

Are Hadza campmate preferences reciprocated?

4.

Is being a preferred campmate or reciprocating relationships associated with

greater reproductive success?
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Method
Population
The Hadza are a group of nomadic hunter-gatherers living along the Central Rift
Valley in northern Tanzania. There are approximately 1000 people who identify as
Hadza, but only about 200 to 300 Hadza still obtain most of their calories via foraged
foods and maintain a hunter-gatherer lifestyle (Marlowe, 2010). The Hadza have high
rates of morbidity and mortality, and approximately 40% of children born will die before
reaching the age of five (Blurton-Jones, 2016). Fresh water is scarce and hunger is a
concern. Over 80% of Hadza report being concerned with having enough food to eat
(Apicella, 2018). Hadza life is built on high levels of cooperation – food, protection, and
childcare is shared (Crittenden & Marlowe, 2008).
Hadza life is marked by a sexual division of labor where men spend time hunting
and collecting honey and women spend time gathering food resources such as berries and
tubers. Food, and in particular meat and items requiring extended processing (e.g.,
tubers), is widely shared among camp members (Marlowe, 2010), though producers may
be able to direct some of the food to their kin (Wood & Marlowe, 2013). The Hadza have
no formal status hierarchies, and Hadza are largely autonomous and able to make their
own decisions.
The Hadza live in temporary camps of about 30 adults and children, typically
consisting of a few unrelated nuclear families. Like most other hunter-gatherers, average
relatedness within camps is low and Hadza live with only a few primary kin and have a
multilocal resident pattern (Hill et al., 2011). Living arrangements are fluid. Entire camps
shift locations every four to eight weeks in response to local resource availability.
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Membership within camps also change regularly, with individuals or families freely
relocating to other camps (Hill et al., 2014). In a longitudinal census across years, people
on average were only living with about one in five of their campmates from previous
years (K. M. Smith et al., 2018). This fluid social structure means the Hadza are regularly
choosing new campmates to live with and can freely leave campmates they no longer
want to live with.
The Hadza do not have formal sanctioning mechanisms for norm violations.
Historically, the Hadza have had little to no interaction with authoritarian government
institutions such as a police force, court system, or prisons. Though the Hadza do have
beliefs in gods, they generally do not ascribe to them moralistic concerns or the ability to
detect and punish transgressions (Apicella, 2018; Purzycki et al., 2016), though there is
evidence this is changing. And in economic games, the Hadza have low rates of secondand third-party punishment (Henrich, 2006). These conditions—relying on campmates to
cooperate, frequent movement and changing of campmates, and little threat of
punishment—make the Hadza an ideal population to study the role of cooperative
reputation in partner choice.
Sample
We visited 12 camps during the dry-season in August-September 2016 using a
snowball sampling procedure; after visiting one camp, members of that camp would
direct us toward the nearest camp. We collected data until we could not identify any more
camps. The number of adults in each camp ranged from three to twelve. We had 95
subjects ranked by their campmates for N = 730 observations. However, we removed two
subjects with missing demographic information, and we removed two judges because
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they refused to rank their campmates on honesty, insisting everyone lies. Another judge
refused to rank more than two campmates on preferred future campmates. Our final
sample had 93 subjects (n = 44 men; estimated age M = 39.9, SD = 14.5 years-old; n = 67
married), ranked by 92 judges, for n = 683 observations. In analyses examining
relationships with rankings of hunting ability, only men were ranked (see below). For
those analyses, our sample had 42 male subjects (two men were the sole man in their
respective camps and could not be ranked) being ranked by 84 subjects for n = 324
observations.
Procedures
Upon entering a camp, we took photographs of each participating adult using a
Fujifilm Instax Mini 90 Classic Instant Film Camera which printed 1.8 × 2.4 inch images.
Photographs were headshots taken approximately 2 meters away against a grey photo
screen. In separate interviews, a research assistant would shuffle the photographs of a
judge’s campmates and randomly array the photographs in front of the judge. The
interviewer then asked, “Who is the most generous?” After the judge chose a person in
the array, the interviewer removed the person who was selected, picked up all the
photographs, shuffled them, and arrayed them out again in front of the judge before
repeating the question. This was repeated until all campmates were ranked. Judges also
ranked themselves among their campmates on all dimensions except preferred campmate;
however, because our research questions are about preferred campmates, we removed
self-rankings and entered rankings as if the judges did not rank themselves. All
interviews were conducted in Swahili by a Tanzanian research assistant and overseen by
the first author. The Hadza have previous experience on this task and ranking their
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campmates on hunting ability (Apicella, 2014; K. M. Smith et al., 2017; StibbardHawkes et al., 2018).
We asked participants to rank campmates on five traits. These were generosity
(“Who is the most generous?”), effort (“Who works the hardest to get food?”), honesty,
(“Who is the most honest?”), hunting ability, (“Who is the best hunter?”), and who they
prefer to live with (“Who would you most like to live with if you were to move camp
tomorrow?”). We asked every participant these questions in the same order. We chose to
ask about generosity, effort, and honesty because previous interviews suggest these to be
important character traits to the Hadza (Purzycki et al., 2018). For hunting ability, we
asked men and women to rank only men on this trait. After participants ranked
campmates on who they would like to live with we asked the participants to explain their
relationship with each campmate. We classified a pair as kin only if both participants
named each other as primary genetic kin (siblings or parent-child).
We collected data on demographic information in separate interviews. We asked
participants whether they were married and estimated their age based on appearance. We
asked each participant to list the names of all children born to them and then list the
names of those who had died. These data were used to calculate reproductive histories.
Data analysis and software
We analyzed the data using multilevel Bayesian regression models. Bayesian
analyses produce posterior distributions for parameters describing the likelihood that a
particular value of the parameter would generate the observed data, conditional on the
prior probability and assumptions within the model (Kruschke & Liddell, 2018a;
McElreath, 2016). Our goal in the study was to estimate the relationship between
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rankings on the various traits and describe the uncertainty around those estimates;
Bayesian analyses provide a framework for quantifying these values in the posterior
distributions (Kruschke & Liddell, 2018b). As such, we emphasize describing the
posterior distributions rather than explicit hypothesis testing. We use multilevel models to
better pool information across clusters, such as camps, subjects, and judges, and to
address imbalances in sample sizes across clusters (McElreath, 2016). We used weakly
regularizing priors; these are priors that are centered at zero and function to avoid
overfitting to the data and improve computation (McElreath, 2016).
We conducted the analyses in R (R, 2017) using the ‘brms’ (Bürkner, 2017), and
‘tidyverse’ (Wickham, 2017b) packages. The ‘brms’ package uses the programming
language Stan (Carpenter et al., 2017) to implement Monte Carlo Markov Chains to
sample estimates from the posterior distribution. For Stan parameters, all models used
one chain of 20,000 iterations, and 10,000 of those iterations were warmup, with a step
parameter of δ = 0.90.
Results
Before inferential analyses, we first examined zero-order correlations between the
rankings on character traits and preferred campmate. We computed correlations between
each variable at the individual observation level, ignoring clustering within camps,
subjects, and judges. All rankings were centered within camp. Table 3.1 presents the
correlations. All variables were moderately correlated with each other at about the same
range of values.

68

Table 3.1. Zero-Order Correlations Between Character and Preferred Campmate
Rankings
Effort

Generosity

Honesty

Hunting

Preferred
campmate

Effort

1

Generosity

0.27

0.20

0.29

0.25

1

0.27

0.17

0.23

1

0.22

0.23

1

0.29

Honesty
Hunting
Preferred

1

campmate
Note. Values are Pearson’s rs. Hunting reputation only includes men being ranked.

What character traits do Hadza prefer in campmates?
We estimate the extent to which a judge’s perceptions of a campmate’s relative
effort, generosity, and honesty relate to the judge’s preference for that person as a future
campmate. To do this, we regressed ranking of preferred campmate on the rankings of the
other traits using ordered logistic regressions. An ordered logistic regression assumes
there is an unobserved parameter and a set of unobserved thresholds for each category or
rank; as the parameter surpasses each threshold, the observed rank increases, such that
the probability of having a higher rank increases as the parameter increases (McElreath,
2016). The analysis assumes the parameter is a linear function of the variables in the
model.
Rankings on the character traits were centered within each camp so that a onerank change in any camp is relative to its median. Analyses included varying intercept
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and slopes for all effects at the camp level, varying intercept and varying slopes for the
character rankings at the subject level, and varying slopes for subject’s demographics and
character rankings at the judge level. The priors for intercepts were normal distributions
with μ = 0, σ = 2, the priors for coefficients were normal distributions with μ = 0, σ = 0.5,
the priors for the standard deviations in varying effects were half-Cauchy distributions
with μ = 0, σ = 0.5, and the priors for correlations between varying effects were LKJ
correlation distributions with η = 4.
We fit eight models predicting preferred campmate ranking from character
reputation and demographics. The first model regressed preferred campmate ranking on
subject demographics only; demographics were sex, age as a z-score, marital status, and
whether the judge and participant were primary kin or spouse. The other models
regressed preferred campmate ranking on one, two, or all of the character traits and
demographics. Among the eight models, the full model with effort, generosity, honesty,
and demographics was the best fitting model based on the widely-applicable information
criterion (WAIC; see Table 3.2 for model comparisons). Using the WAIC, we calculated
an Akaike weight for each model. The Akaike weight is the estimated probability that a
model would best predict a new sample of data within the given set of models
(McElreath, 2016). The full model had the entire Akaike weight and we consider only
that model further.
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Table 3.2. Fit of Models Regressing Preferred Campmate Rankings on Character
Rankings and Subject Demographics
Model

WAIC

SEWAIC

pWAIC Akaike weight

Demographics

2999.98

27.96

94.01

0.00

Effort

2964.81

32.10

129.57

0.00

Generosity

2984.81

29.77

119.74

0.00

Honesty

2972.37

29.97

126.95

0.00

Effort + Generosity

2939.85

34.12

168.02

0.00

Effort + Honesty

2937.57

33.32

170.30

0.00

Generosity +

2956.29

30.66

166.37

0.00

2889.27

34.56

223.01

1.00

Honesty
Full

Note. WAIC is the widely-applicable information criterion estimate; a lower number
indicates a better fitting model. SEWAIC is the standard error of the WAIC estimate, pWAIC
is the effective number of parameters in the model, and the Akaike weight is computed
from WAIC and is the probability that the model will best predict a new set of data
among the considered models.

Table 3.3 presents the estimates for the coefficients in the full model. There was
good evidence that judges preferred older Hadza and their kin as campmates. There was
also good evidence that judges preferred to live with Hadza they consider harder
working, more generous, and more honest, and the strength of these relationships were
approximately similar for all three character traits. To better understand the strength of
these relationships, we simulated rankings on preferred campmate in the largest camp (11
ranks) and computed the difference in preferred campmate ranking between being highest
and lowest ranked on each character trait. The modal expected rank difference for effort
71

was 1.1 ranks (90% HPDI: 0.0, 2.5), for generosity was 1.2 ranks (90% HPDI: 0.1, 2.3),
and for honesty was 1.6 ranks (90% HPDI: 0.5, 2.6). Figure 3.1 presents the rankings
centered within camp as well as the regression line from the simulated predictions. We
also simulated the probability that someone ranked highest on each character trait would
be ranked at least one rank higher on preferred campmate than someone ranked lowest on
that character trait. The modal probability for effort was 58.8% (90% HPDI: 43.3%,
78.8%), for generosity was 60.2% (90% HPDI: 43.9%, 76.3%), and for honesty was
68.0% (90% HPDI: 50.5%, 80.6%).
Table 3.3. Full Model Regressing Preferred Campmate Ranking on Character
Rankings and Subject Demographics
Coefficient

b

90% HPDI

% </> 0

Effort

0.11

0.00 – 0.24

95.7

Generosity

0.11

0.01 – 0.22

95.4

Honesty

0.15

0.04 – 0.26

99.1

Female

-0.04

-0.52 – 0.36

60.2

Married

0.21

-0.21 – 0.60

79.1

Age

0.41

0.13 – 0.66

98.7

Spouse

0.10

-0.39 – 0.61

65.7

Kin

0.35

-0.10 – 0.80

90.3

Note. The coefficient estimate is the mode of the posterior distribution. The 90% highest
posterior density interval (HPDI) is the narrowest interval containing 90% of the
posterior, or the 90% most plausible coefficient estimates. The last column is the percent
of the posterior greater than (or less than in the case of Female) zero.
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Figure 3.1. Ranking on preferred campmate by ranking on each character trait, centered
within camp. Predictions were simulated by generating 10,000 values from an ordered
logistic distribution for each ranking and the mean of these generated values were
predicted ranking. The line is the mean simulated value and the shaded region is the 90%
credible interval.

Do Hadza prefer male campmates with better character or hunting reputation?
We estimated the extent to which a judge’s perception of a male campmate’s
character and his hunting ability relate to the judge’s preference for that man as a future
campmate, again using ordered logistic regressions. We used the same priors and varying
effects as the ones used in the section above. We fit four models predicting preferred
campmate ranking from character traits, hunting ability, and demographics. The first
model regressed preferred campmate ranking on subject demographics only;
demographics were age as a z-score, marital status, and whether the judge and participant
were primary kin or spouse. The other models were rankings on character traits and
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demographics, hunting ability and demographics, and the full model with character traits,
hunting ability, and demographics. Among the four models, the full model with character
traits, hunting ability, and demographics was the best fitting model (see Table 3.4). The
full model again has the full Akaike weight.
Table 3.4. Fit of Models Regressing Preferred Campmate Rankings on Character
Traits, Hunting Ability, and Subject Demographics for Men
Model

WAIC

SEWAIC

pWAIC Akaike weight

Demographics

1451.63

20.29

51.41

0.00

Character traits

1424.09

25.34

109.35

0.00

Hunting ability

1433.04

22.43

82.92

0.00

Full

1381.94

27.47

153.84

1.00

Note. WAIC is the widely-applicable information criterion estimate; a lower number
indicates a better fitting model. SEWAIC is the standard error of the WAIC estimate, pWAIC
is the effective number of parameters in the model, and the Akaike weight is computed
from WAIC and is the probability that the model will best predict a new set of data
among the considered models.

Table 3.5 presents the estimates for the coefficients in the full model. There was
good evidence that judges prefer men who are older and who are married more as
campmates. There was also good evidence that judges preferred more generous men as
campmates and little evidence that judges preferred hard working or honest men as
campmates. We again simulated rankings on preferred campmate in the largest camp and
computed the difference between being highest and lowest ranked on each character trait
and hunting ability (we simulated eight ranks for hunting ability because the largest camp
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had only eight hunters). The modal expected rank difference for effort was 0.8 ranks
(90% HPDI: -1.0, 2.6), for generosity was 1.6 ranks (90% HPDI: -0.3, 3.0), for honesty
was 0.8 ranks (90% HPDI: -1.1, 2.3), and for hunting was 2.4 ranks (90% HPDI: 0.4,
4.2). Figure 3.2 presents the rankings centered within camp as well as the regression line
from the simulated predictions. We again simulated the probability that someone ranked
highest on each character trait would be ranked at least one rank higher on preferred
campmate than someone ranked lowest on that character trait. The modal probability for
effort was 55.3% (90% HPDI: 28.7%, 82.9%), for generosity was 70.4% (90% HPDI:
42.8%, 88.3%), for honesty was 55.3% (90% HPDI: 27.5%, 78.3%), and for hunting was
83.3% (90% HPDI: 51.5%, 95.9%).
Table 3.5. Full Model Regressing Preferred Campmate Ranking on Character
Traits, Hunting and Subject Demographics for Men
Coefficient

b

90% HPDI

% </> 0

Effort

0.09

-0.10 – 0.28

78.8

Generosity

0.15

-0.03 – 0.31

91.5

Honesty

0.06

-0.11 – 0.23

73.6

Hunting

0.34

0.04 – 0.63

96.7

Married

0.53

-0.04 – 1.15

92.7

Age

0.43

-0.08 – 0.81

90.9

Spouse

-0.06

-0.69 – 0.62

55.5

Kin

-0.02

-0.64 – 0.59

51.6

Note. The coefficient estimate is the mode of the posterior distribution. The 90% highest
posterior density interval (HPDI) is the narrowest interval containing 90% of the
posterior, or the 90% most plausible coefficient estimates. The last column is the percent
of the posterior greater than (or less than for Spouse and Kin) zero.
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We also compared the difference in coefficient estimates across the posterior
between hunting ability and each character trait. The modal difference between hunting
ability and effort was Δb = 0.20 (90% HPDI: -0.11, 0.61; 86.2% Δb > 0), t between
generosity was Δb = 0.18 (90% HPDI: -0.17, 0.52; 82.1% Δb > 0), and honesty was Δb =
0.29 (90% HPDI: -0.08, 0.60; 89.9% Δb > 0). There was some evidence that judges had
stronger preferences for hunting ability than character.
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Figure 3.2. Ranking on preferred campmate by ranking on each character trait and
hunting ability, centered within camp. Predictions were simulated by generating 10,000
values from an ordered logistic distribution for each ranking and the mean of these
generated values were predicted ranking. The line is the mean simulated value and the
shaded region is the 90% credible interval.
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Do Hadza reciprocate campmate preferences?
We next estimate to what extent Hadza reciprocate campmate preferences. That
is, do Hadza prefer to live with campmates who prefer to live with them? We use
reciprocated campmate preferences as a proxy of friendship to test friendship models of
partner choice. We computed for each judge-subject dyad whether their rankings were
concordant (both ranked each other at or above median or both ranked each other at or
below the median) or not. Of the all the dyads, only 58.9% mutually ranked each other
above or below the median, suggesting there is not a lot of reciprocity in campmate
preferences. Figure 3.3 plots ego’s ranking of alter and alter’s ranking of ego, with a line
connecting each dyad. If there was reciprocity, the plot would have short lines clustering
the diagonal; however, the long lines indicate little reciprocity. We also examined
individual variation in the extent to which Hadza reciprocate campmate preferences. We
computed for each person a Kendall’s τ between ego’s rankings and their alters’ rankings.
Figure 3.4 plots the histogram of these values. There was variation between Hadza in the
extent to which they reciprocated campmate preferences; values ranged from -1 to 0.75.
The median value was -0.05 and 50% of the values fell between -0.45 and 0.07. Only
40.9% of the values were positive, again indicating there was little overall reciprocation
in the population.
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Figure 3.3. Plot of alter’s rank of ego by ego’s rank of alter. A line connects each dyad of
ego and alter; reciprocity would be indicated by short lines near the diagonal.

Figure 3.4. The distribution of each judge’s correlation between their ranking of alter and
alters’ ranking of them using Kendall’s τ. The dashed line indicates the median.

We estimated the extent to which campmate preferences are reciprocated by
fitting two models using ordered logistic regressions. We regress rankings of campmate
preferences and alter’s ranking of ego on campmate preferences with demographic
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variables, and a second model that also included rankings on effort, generosity, and
honesty. Priors and model details were the same as the first section on campmate
preferences. We compare the two models to the full model from that section with all three
character traits and demographics (here referred to as the character model). The character
model with the reciprocal rankings was the best fitting model of the three; however, the
Akaike weight was split between that model and the full model including the reciprocal
rankings (see Table 3.6). We constructed a weighted-average posterior of the two models
(McElreath, 2016) and analyze that posterior further.
Table 3.6. Fit of Models Regressing Preferred Campmate Rankings on Character
Traits, Reciprocal Rankings and Subject Demographics
Model

WAIC

SEWAIC

pWAIC Akaike weight

Character

2889.27

34.56

223.01

0.20

Reciprocal rankings

2991.48

28.52

117.98

0.00

Full

2886.51

34.35

243.74

0.80

Note. WAIC is the widely-applicable information criterion estimate; a lower number
indicates a better fitting model. SEWAIC is the standard error of the WAIC estimate, pWAIC
is the effective

Table 3.7 presents the estimates from the weighted-average posterior. Again,
there was good evidence that Hadza preferred older Hadza and their kin as campmates,
and that Hadza prefer Hadza ranked higher on the character traits. However, there was
little evidence that Hadza reciprocate campmate preferences. If there is a relationship
between ego’s and alter’s rankings, it is likely smaller than the association between
character rankings and campmate preferences. We compared the difference in coefficient
80

estimates across the posterior between each character ranking and the reciprocal ranking.
The modal difference between effort and reciprocal ranking was Δb = 0.14 (90% HPDI: 0.04, 0.29; 87.6% Δb > 0), the modal difference between generosity and reciprocal
ranking was Δb = 0.10 (90% HPDI: -0.05, 0.27; 87.2% Δb > 0), and the modal difference
between honesty and reciprocal ranking was Δb = 0.13 (90% HPDI: -0.03, 0.29; 92.4%
Δb > 0).
Table 3.7. Weighted-Average Posterior Regressing Preferred Campmate Ranking
on Character Rankings, Reciprocal Rankings, and Subject Demographics
Coefficient

b

90% HPDI

% </> 0

Effort

0.12

0.00 – 0.25

95.8

Generosity

0.12

0.00 – 0.23

95.5

Honesty

0.15

0.04 – 0.25

98.6

Reciprocal ranking

0.00

-0.11 – 0.13

46.3

Female

-0.05

-0.50 – 0.37

59.9

Married

0.19

-0.19 – 0.62

79.9

Age

0.42

0.13 – 0.69

98.5

Spouse

0.13

-0.40 – 0.60

65.4

Kin

0.35

-0.11 – 0.81

89.9

Note. The coefficient estimate is the mode of the posterior distribution. The 90% highest
posterior density interval (HPDI) is the narrowest interval containing 90% of the
posterior, or the 90% most plausible coefficient estimates. The last column is the percent
of the posterior greater than (or less than in the case of Female) zero. The distribution for
Reciprocal ranking was bimodal, so a continuous HPDI was used.
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Are there reproductive benefits to being a valued partner?
We estimate to what extent character reputation, being a preferred campmate, and
reciprocating campmate preferences are associated with reproductive success. We
computed a mean rank for each character trait and being a preferred campmate using the
camp-centered ranks, and we used the Kendall’s τ computed in the above section as a
measure of reciprocated campmate preferences. We regressed subjects’ number of living
children on demographic variables (excluding age, see below), character reputation,
desirability as a campmate, and tendency to reciprocate campmate preferences using a
Poisson regression with a log link-function. A Poisson regression is a count regression
that estimates the rate of an event or observation over time and space (McElreath, 2016).
An important assumption is that the exposure time is constant across participants, and
older Hadza have more reproductive opportunities. To address this, we add age as a
constant offset, taking the logarithm of participant’s age – 15, and for women, a max
value of logarithm of 30 (max age 45) to reflect the reproductive window for Hadza
(Blurton-Jones, 2016). Analyses included varying intercepts and slopes for each effect at
the camp level. The priors for the intercepts were normal distributions with μ = 2, σ = 1,
the priors for coefficients were normal distributions with μ = 0, σ = 1.5, the priors for the
standard deviations in varying effects were half-Cauchy distributions with μ = 0, σ = 0.6,
and the priors for correlations between varying effects were LKJ correlation distributions
with η = 4. The step parameter was increased to δ = 0.95 to avoid divergent transitions
during sampling (Carpenter et al., 2017).
We fit six models predicting number of living children from demographic
variables, character reputation, desirability as a campmate, and tendency to reciprocate
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campmate preferences. The demographics model included sex, marital status, and an
interaction between sex and marital status. The character model included demographics
and the mean rankings on effort, generosity, and honesty. The preferred campmate model
included demographics and the mean ranking on being a preferred campmate. The
reciprocated ranking model included tendency to reciprocate campmate preferences and
demographics. The social selection model included mean ranking on being a preferred
campmate, tendency to reciprocate campmate preferences, and demographics. Finally,
the full model included mean rankings on effort, generosity, honesty, and being a
preferred campmate, and tendency to reciprocate campmate preferences, and
demographics. The demographics only model was the best fitting model (see Table 3.8).
However, the Akaike weight is split between all the models, particularly those that do not
include character rankings. We construct a weighted-average posterior from the other
four models and examine that posterior further.
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Table 3.8. Fit of Models Number of Living Children on Character, Preferred
Campmate, and Reciprocated Rankings
Model

WAIC

SEWAIC

pWAIC

Akaike weight

Demographics

326.65

12.16

9.24

0.54

Character traits

332.77

11.92

13.71

0.03

Preferred campmate

329.32

12.08

10.45

0.14

Reciprocated rankings

328.28

12.13

10.32

0.24

Social selection

331.13

12.11

11.61

0.06

Full

336.83

12.02

15.92

0.00

Note. WAIC is the widely-applicable information criterion estimate; a lower number
indicates a better fitting model. SEWAIC is the standard error of the WAIC estimate, pWAIC
is the effective number of parameters in the model, and the Akaike weight is computed
from WAIC and is the probability that the model will best predict a new set of data
among the considered models; the weights do not add up to 1 because of rounding.

Table 3.9 presents the estimates for the coefficients in the average-weighted
model. There was strong evidence that demographic variables relate to reproductive
success; being a woman or married was associated with more living children, though the
effect of marriage was much smaller for women than men. There was little evidence that
being a more preferred campmate was associated with more living children (see Figure
3.5) or that have more reciprocated rankings was associated with more living children
(see Figure 3.6).
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Table 3.9. Weighted-Average Posterior Regressing Number of Living Children on
Preferred Campmate Ranking, Reciprocated Rankings, and Demographics
Coefficient

b

90% HPDI

% </> 0

-2.65

-3.05 – -2.17

100

Female

0.84

0.35 – 1.35

99.9

Married

0.72

0.30 – 1.20

99.9

-0.76

-1.32 – -0.23

99.8

Preferred campmate

0.00

-0.05 – 0.04

8.8

Reciprocated rankings

0.00

-0.11 – 0.27

18.6

Intercept

Female × Married

Note. The coefficient estimate is the mode of the posterior distribution. The 90% highest
posterior density interval (HPDI) is the narrowest interval containing 90% of the
posterior, or the 90% most plausible coefficient estimates. The last column is the percent
of the posterior greater than (or less than for Intercept and Female × Married) zero. The
distributions for Preferred campmate and Reciprocated ranking were bimodal and a
continuous HPDI was used.

Figure 3.5. Number of living children by mean preferred campmate ranking. The line is
the regression line from the median of the weighted-average posterior, and the shaded
region is the 90% credible interval.
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Figure 3.6. Number of living children by the correlation between ego’s and alters’
rankings. The line is the regression line from the median of the weighted-average
posterior, and the shaded region is the 90% credible interval.

Discussion
Group living affords many advantages including the establishment of mutually
beneficial exchange partners that can increase individual reproductive success. Yet, little
work has examined the relative value of various traits in preferences for non-reproductive
(i.e. social) partners in populations relevant for the setting of human evolution. Nor has
work examined whether preferred partners gain reproductive benefits from being in high
demand.
Here, we explored the determinants of partner choice among the Hadza,
examining the role character, productivity, and reciprocity play in campmate preferences.
We found positive, but arguably weak, associations between evaluations of effort,
generosity, and honesty and being a preferred campmate. Instead, the evidence suggests
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that hunting ability is more important than character when choosing male campmates,
suggesting that productivity outweighs character when selecting social partners. Contrary
to prior research, we also found little evidence to suggest that Hadza reciprocate
campmate preferences. Finally, there was little evidence to suggest that being a desirable
campmate or having stronger reciprocal relationships is associated with greater
reproductive success. Together, these results suggest that preference for more cooperative
partners do not play a role in maintaining cooperation among the Hadza.
The expected strength of the relationship between character traits and being a
preferred campmate should be evaluated relative to the investment cost of improving
one’s relative reputation as a social partner and the benefits of being a preferred
campmate. Our results provide little evidence that being a desired campmate is associated
with greater reproductive success and suggests desirable partners receive few benefits.
And though we do not have direct evidence of the costs of improving one’s reputation,
there is other evidence to suggest that it is often difficult—and thus costly—to reliably
improve one’s reputation. For example, hunting reputation only loosely tracks hunting
ability and can only reliably distinguish the best hunters from the worst hunters
(Stibbard-Hawkes et al., 2018). And among Dominican laborers, character reputation
tends to be slow changing relative to changes in behavior (Macfarlan et al., 2013). That
is, reputation is noisy relative to actual behavior, and changes in behavior do not
guarantee changes in one’s reputation. The high costs of increasing one’s reputation and
the low benefits of being a preferred campmate suggests that the associations observed
here are too small for partner choice to be a viable mechanism for maintaining
cooperation.
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However, it is not the case that the Hadza have no preferences for campmates.
There was evidence that perception of hunting ability was an important criterion for
campmates. This finding is consistent with prior research showing that Hadza men prefer
to live in hypothetical camps with better hunters (Wood, 2006). Moreover, individuals
with traits associated with greater health, which may indicate better productivity, such as
height, muscle mass, body fat were positively, were more likely to be nominated as future
campmates (Apicella et al., 2012). However, the current results suggest there is little
benefit to reproductive success by being a preferred campmate. This suggests there is no
incentive for Hadza men to hunt to attain access to valuable social partners (Hawkes,
1993), and previous associations between hunting reputation and reproductive success in
the Hadza (Apicella, 2014) may have been due to direct benefits provided to spouse and
children (Wood & Marlowe, 2013), and/or access to higher quality mates (Hawkes,
1991).
There are three key limitations to the current study. First, we only examined three
character traits: effort, generosity, and honesty. We chose these traits because they were
previously identified by the Hadza as being morally relevant (Purzycki et al., 2018), and
all involve putting someone else’s welfare before one’s own. However, there may be
other character traits that Hadza believe are more important in campmates. Second, the
rankings were within camp and there may be a limited range within the camp to estimate
the association between perceptions of character and who is a preferred campmate or
between who is a preferred campmate and reproductive success. However, given that
these results are corroborated using between camp methods (Apicella et al., 2012; K. M.
Smith et al., 2018), this may not be a problem in our data. Third, the analyses are
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correlational, which may be particularly problematic for analyses of reproductive success.
It could be that an unobserved variable is suppressing the relationships between being a
preferred campmate and reproductive success.
A basic rule for the evolution of cooperation is that cooperation must “cluster,”
with the benefits of cooperation preferentially flowing to other cooperators (Wilson &
Dugatkin, 1997), and previous research among the Hadza has found that cooperation does
indeed cluster within camps (K. M. Smith et al., 2018). Given the fluidity of huntergatherer groups and the flexibility of who hunter-gatherers can live with, one might
expect partner choice for cooperation to be an important way to maintain clustering.
However, a number of findings present difficulties to this hypothesis. First, for partner
choice to be a viable strategy, current willingness to cooperate must reliably indicate
future willingness to cooperate. However, among the Hadza, willingness to cooperate is
not stable and instead changes to adopt to local norms (K. M. Smith et al., 2018). Second,
people must prefer more cooperative partners. The results presented here suggest such
preferences are weak, and other studies have failed to find an association between
generosity in economic games and having more social ties in the Hadza (Apicella et al.,
2012). And when actual living patterns are observed, cooperation in previous years does
not predict more cooperative partners in future years (K. M. Smith et al., 2018). Third,
being a preferred partner should be associated with greater reproductive success. The
results here and previous results with the Hadza (Apicella et al., 2012) and the Batek
foragers of Central Africa (Kraft, Venkataraman, Tacey, Dominy, & Endicott, 2018).
These results are inconsistent with partner choice models of cooperation, and suggest that
partner choice does not maintain cooperation in hunter-gatherer groups.
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Why would the Hadza not have stronger preferences for more cooperative
campmates? An important assumption in partner choice models is that there is
meaningful variation along the dimensions of cooperativeness and productivity for which
to choose partners based on. When there is reduced variability on one dimension, the
other dimension becomes more important in partner choice decisions (Barclay, 2016b).
And without variation, then people are interchangeable along that dimension and the
threat of exiting the relationship provides no incentive for partners to cooperate.
One possibility is that strong norms of egalitarianism govern cooperative behavior
in hunter-gatherers (Cashdan, 1980), which reduces variation in cooperative behavior as
people conform to the local norms (K. M. Smith et al., 2018). Another possibility is that
populations from small-scale societies have behavioral variation. For example, the
Tsimané of Bolivia have fewer personality traits and vary less upon those dimension
compared to university samples (Gurven et al., 2013). And across societies, populations
with access to fewer economic niches have less behavioral variation than Western
societies (Lukaszewski et al., 2017). One explanation is that more economic opportunities
allows for more behavioral variation and encourages individuation to fill those niches
(Gurven, 2018; Smaldino, Lukaszewski, von Rueden, & Gurven, 2018). In population
likes the Hadza with no economic specialization, there is little room for behavioral
variation, including variation on cooperative behavior. As a result, there is no compete on
being cooperative partner.
Our results suggest that the Hadza do not choose partners based on cooperation.
Rather, a campmates’ ability to produce benefits in the first place play a more important
role in how Hadza choose campmates. We argue that social selection for cooperative
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partners is unlikely to have played a major role in the evolution of human cooperation
and that social selection for productive partners may have played a larger role in shaping
human partner choice decisions.

91

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Aktipis, C. A. (2011). Is cooperation viable in mobile organisms? Simple Walk Away
rule favors the evolution of cooperation in groups. Evolution and Human Behavior,
32(4), 263–276. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2011.01.002
Alexander, R. D. (1987). The Biology of Moral Systems. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
Apicella, C. L. (2014). Upper-body strength predicts hunting reputation and reproductive
success in Hadza hunter–gatherers. Evolution and Human Behavior, 35(6), 508–518.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2014.07.001
Apicella, C. L. (2018). High levels of rule-bending in a minimally religious and largely
egalitarian forager population. Religion, Brain & Behavior, 8(2), 133–148.
https://doi.org/10.1080/2153599X.2016.1267034
Apicella, C. L., Azevedo, E. M., Christakis, N. A., & Fowler, J. H. (2014). Evolutionary
origins of the endowment effect: Evidence from hunter-gatherers. American
Economic Review, 104(6), 1793–1805. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.6.1793
Apicella, C. L., & Barrett, H. C. (2016). Cross-cultural evolutionary psychology. Current
Opinion in Psychology, 7, 92–97. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2015.08.015
Apicella, C. L., & Crittenden, A. N. (2016). Hunter-gatherer families and parenting. In D.
M. Buss (Ed.), The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology (pp. 579–597). Hoboken:
Wiley & Sons.
Apicella, C. L., Marlowe, F. W., Fowler, J. H., & Christakis, N. A. (2012). Social
networks and cooperation in hunter-gatherers. Nature, 481(7382), 497–501.
https://doi.org/10.1038/nature10736
Apicella, C. L., & Silk, J. B. (2019). The evolution of human cooperation. Current
92

Biology.
Bache, S. M., & Wickham, H. (2014). magrittr: A forward-pipe operator for R. Retrieved
from https://cran.r-project.org/package=magrittr
Baptiste, A. (2017). gridExtra: Miscellaneous functions for “Grid” graphics.
Barakzai, A., & Shaw, A. (2018). Friends without benefits: When we react negatively to
helpful and generous friends. Evolution and Human Behavior, 39(5), 529–537.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2018.05.004
Barclay, P. (2013). Strategies for cooperation in biological markets, especially for
humans. Evolution and Human Behavior, 34(3), 164–175.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2013.02.002
Barclay, P. (2016a). Biological markets and the effects of partner choice on cooperation
and friendship. Current Opinion in Psychology, 7, 33–38.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2015.07.012
Barclay, P. (2016b). Reputation. In The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology (pp. 810–
828). Hoboken: Wiley.
Barclay, P., & Raihani, N. J. (2016). Partner choice versus punishment in human
prisoner’s dilemmas. Evolution and Human Behavior, 37(4), 263–271.
Barclay, P., & Willer, R. (2007). Partner choice creates competitive altruism in humans.
Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 274(1610), 749–753.
https://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2006.0209
Barrett, H. C., Bolyanatz, A., Crittenden, A. N., Fessler, D. M. T., Fitzpatrick, S.,
Gurven, M., … Laurence, S. (2016). Small-scale societies exhibit fundamental
variation in the role of intentions in moral judgments. Proceedings of the National
93

Academy, 113(17), 4688–4693.
Baumard, N., André, J.-B., & Sperber, D. (2013). A mutualistic approach to morality:
The evolution of fairness by partner choice. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 36(01),
59–78. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X11002202
Bell, A. V., Richerson, P. J., & Mcelreath, R. (2009). Culture rather than genes provide
greater scope for the evolution of large-scale human prosociality. Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences, 106(42), 17671–17674.
Berbesque, J. C., & Marlowe, F. (2009). Sex differences in food preferences of Hadza
hunter-gatherers. Evolutionary Psychology, 7(4), 601–616.
Bliege Bird, R., & Power, E. A. (2015). Prosocial signaling and cooperation among
Martu hunters. Evolution and Human Behavior, 36(5), 389–397.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2015.02.003
Bliege Bird, R., Scelza, B., Bird, D. W., & Smith, E. A. (2012). The hierarchy of virtue:
mutualism, altruism and signaling in Martu women’s cooperative hunting. Evolution
and Human Behavior, 33(1), 64–78.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2011.05.007
Blurton-Jones, N. (2016). Deomgraphy and Evolutionary Ecology of Hadza HunterGatherers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bowles, S., & Gintis, H. (2004). The evolution of strong reciprocity: Cooperation in
heterogeneous populations. Theoretical Population Biology, 65, 17–28.
Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. J. (1982). Cultural transmission and the evolution of
cooperative behavior. Human Ecology, 10(3), 325–351.
Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. J. (1992). Punishmet allows the evolution of cooperation (or
94

anything else) in sizable groups. Ethology and Sociobiology, 13(3), 171–195.
Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. J. (2006). Solving the puzzle of human cooperation. In S. C.
Levinson & P. Jaisson (Eds.), Evolution and Culture (pp. 105–132). Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. J. (2009). Culture and the evolution of human cooperation.
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 364(1533),
3281–3288. https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2009.0134
Brambilla, M., Rusconi, P., Sacchi, S., & Cherubini, P. (2011). Looking for honesty: The
primary role of morality (vs. sociability and competence) in information gathering.
European Journal of Social Psychology, 41(2), 135–143.
https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.744
Bürkner, P.-C. (2017). brms : An R Package for Bayesian Multilevel Models Using Stan.
Journal of Statistical Software, 80(1), 1–28. https://doi.org/10.18637/jss.v080.i01
Buston, P. M., & Emlen, S. T. (2003). Cognitive processes underlying human mate
choice: The relationship between self-perception and mate preference in Western
society. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 100(15), 8805–8810.
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1533220100
Butts, C. (2008). network: A package for managing relational data in R. Journal of
Statistical Software, 24(2).
Butts, C. (2016). sna: Tools for social network analysis.
Carpenter, B., Gelman, A., Hoffman, M. D., Lee, D., Goodrich, B., Betancourt, M., …
Riddell, A. (2017). Stan : A Probabilistic Programming Language. Journal of
Statistical Software, 76(1). https://doi.org/10.18637/jss.v076.i01
95

Cashdan, E. A. (1980). Egalitarianism among hunters and gatherers. American
Anthropologist, 82(1), 116–120.
Chaudhary, N., Salali, G. D., Thompson, J., Rey, A., Gerbault, P., Stevenson, E. G. J., …
Migliano, A. B. (2016). Competition for Cooperation: Variability, benefits and
heritability of relational wealth in hunter-gatherers. Scientific Reports, 6(June), 1–7.
https://doi.org/10.1038/srep29120
Chudek, M., & Henrich, J. (2011). Culture-gene coevolution, norm psychology, and the
emergence of human prosociality. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 15(5), 218–226.
Cohen, T. R., Panter, A. T., Turan, N., Morse, L., & Kim, Y. (2013). Agreement and
similarity in self-other perceptions of moral character. Journal of Research in
Personality, 47(6), 816–830. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2013.08.009
Cottrell, C. A., Neuberg, S. L., & Li, N. P. (2007). What do people desire in others? A
sociofunctional perspective on the importance of different valued characteristics.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92(2), 208–231.
https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.92.2.208
Crittenden, A. N., & Marlowe, F. W. (2008). Allomaternal care among the Hadza of
Tanzania. Human Nature, 19(3), 249–262. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12110-0089043-3
Csardi, G., & Nepusz, T. (2006). The igraph software package for complex network
research. InterJournal, Complex Systems.
Curry, O. S., Mullins, D. A., & Whitehouse, H. (2019). Is it good to cooperate? Testing
the theory of morality-as-cooperation in 60 societies. Current Anthropology, 60(1),
47–69. https://doi.org/10.1086/701478
96

Darley, J. M., & Batson, C. D. (1973). “From Jerusalem to Jericho”: A study of
situational and dispositional variables in helping behavior. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 27(1), 100–108. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0034449
Darley, J. M., & Latané, B. (1968). Bystander intervention in emergencies: Diffusion of
responsibility. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 8(4, Pt.1), 377–383.
https://doi.org/10.1037/h0025589
DeScioli, P., & Kurzban, R. (2009). The alliance hypothesis for human friendship. PLoS
ONE, 4(6), e5802.
DeScioli, P., Kurzban, R., Koch, E. N., & Liben-Nowell, D. (2011). Best friends:
Alliances, friend ranking, and the MySpace social network. Perspectives on
Psychological Science, 6(1), 6–8. https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691610393979
Doris, J. M. (2002). Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Dugatkin, L. A., & Wilson, D. S. (1991). Rover: A strategy for exploiting cooperators in
a patchy environment. The American Naturalist, 183(3), 687–701.
Eisenbruch, A. B., Grillot, R. L., Maestripieri, D., & Roney, J. R. (2016). Evidence of
partner choice heuristics in a one-shot bargaining game. Evolution and Human
Behavior, 37(6), 429–439. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2016.04.002
Eisenbruch, A. B., & Roney, J. R. (2017). The Skillful and the stingy: Partner choice
decisions and fairness intuitions suggest human adaptation for a biological market of
cooperators. Evolutionary Psychological Science, 3(4), 364–378.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s40806-017-0107-7
Ellemers, N., van der Toorn, J., Paunov, Y., & van Leeuwen, T. (2019). The psychology
97

of morality: A review and analysis of empirical studies published from 1940 through
2017. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 108886831881175.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1088868318811759
Enquist, M., & Leimar, O. (1993). The evolution of cooperation in mobile organisms.
Animal Behaviour, 45(4), 747–757.
Eshel, I., & Cavalli-Sforza, L. L. (1982). Assortment of encounters and evolution of
cooperativeness. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 79(4), 1331–
1335.
Everett, J. A. C., Faber, N. S., Savulescu, J., & Crockett, M. J. (2018). The costs of being
consequentialist: Social inference from instrumental harm and impartial
beneficence. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 79, 200–216.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2018.07.004
Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2003). The nature of human altruism. Nature, 425, 785–791.
Fleeson, W., Furr, R. M., Jayawickreme, E., Meindl, P., & Helzer, E. G. (2014).
Character: The prospects for a personality-based perspective on morality. Social and
Personality Psychology Compass, 8(4), 178–191.
https://doi.org/10.1111/spc3.12094
Fletcher, J. A., & Doebeli, M. (2009). A simple and general explanation for the evolution
of altruism. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 276(1654),
13–19.
Fowler, J. H., & Christakis, N. A. (2010). Cooperative behavior cascades in human social
networks. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 107(12), 5334–5338.
Frimer, J. A., Biesanz, J. C., Walker, L. J., & MacKinlay, C. W. (2013). Liberals and
98

conservatives rely on common moral foundations when making moral judgments
about influential people. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 104(6),
1040–1059. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0032277
Gabbi, G., & Zanotti, G. (2019). Sex & the City: Are financial decisions driven by
emotions? Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, 21, 50–57.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbef.2018.10.005
Gamer, M., Lemon, J., & Fellows, I. (2012). irr: Various coefficients of interrater
reliability and agreement. Retrieved from https://cran.r-project.org/package=irr
Gintis, H. (2000). Strong reciprocity and human sociality. Journal of Theoretical Biology,
206(2), 169–179.
Goodwin, G. P. (2015). Moral character in person perception. Current Directions in
Psychological Science, 24(1), 38–44.
Goodwin, G. P., Piazza, J., & Rozin, P. (2014). Moral character predominates in person
perception and evaluation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 106(1),
148–168. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0034726
Graham, N., Arai, M., & Hagströmer, B. (2016). multiwayvcov: Multi-way standard error
clustering.
Gurven, M. (2006). The evolution of contingent cooperation. Current Anthropology,
47(1), 185–192.
Gurven, M. (2014). The Tsimane rarely punish: An experimental investigation of
dictators, ultimatums, and punishment. In J. Ensminger & J. Henrich (Eds.),
Experimenting with Social Norms: Fairness and Punishment in Cross-Cultural
Perspective (pp. 197–224). New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
99

Gurven, M. (2018). Broadening horizons: Sample diversity and socioecological theory
are essential to the future of psychological science. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences, 115(45), 11420–11427.
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1720433115
Gurven, M., Allen-Arave, W., Hill, K., & Hurtado, M. (2000). “It’s a Wonderful Life”:
Signaling generosity among the Ache of Paraguay. Evolution and Human Behavior,
21(4), 263–282. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1090-5138(00)00032-5
Gurven, M., von Rueden, C., Massenkoff, M., Kaplan, H., & Vie, M. L. (2013). How
universal is the Big Five? Testing the five-factor model of personality variation
among forager-farmers in the Bolivian Amazon. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 104(2), 354–370. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0030841
Haidt, J., Koller, S. H., & Dias, M. G. (1993). Affect, culture, and morality, or is it wrong
to eat your dog? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65(4), 613–628.
https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.65.4.613
Hamilton, W. D. (1964). The genetical evolution of social behaviour. II. Journal of
Theoretical Biology, 7(1), 17–52.
Hardy, C. L., & Van Vugt, M. (2006). Nice guys finish first: The competitive altruism
hypothesis. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 32(10), 1402–1413.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167206291006
Harman, G. (2003). No character or personality. Business Ethics Quarterly, 13(1), 87–94.
https://doi.org/10.5840/beq20031316
Hawkes, K. (1991). Showing off: Tests of an hypothesis about men’s foraging goals.
Ethology and Sociobiology, 12(1), 29–54. https://doi.org/10.1016/0162100

3095(91)90011-E
Hawkes, K. (1993). Why hunter-gatherers work: An ancient version of the problem of
public goods. Current Anthropology, 34(4), 341–361.
https://doi.org/10.1086/204182
Hawkes, K., O’Connell, J. F., & Blurton-Jones, N. (1991). Hunting income patterns
among the Hadza: big game, common goods, foraging goals and the evolution of the
human diet. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B:
Biological Sciences, 334(1270), 243–251. https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.1991.0113
Heine, S. (2001). Self as cultural product: An examination of East Asian and North
American selves. Journal of Personality, 69(6), 881–905.
Helzer, E. G., Furr, R. M., Hawkins, A., Barranti, M., Blackie, L. E. R., & Fleeson, W.
(2014). Agreement on the perception of moral character. Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin, 40(12), 1698–1710.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167214554957
Henrich, J. (2004). Cultural group selection, coevolutionary processes and large-scale
cooperation. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 53(1), 3–35.
Henrich, J. (2006). Costly punishment across human societies. Science, 312(5781), 1767–
1770. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1127333
Henrich, J., & Boyd, R. (2001). Why people punish defectors: Weak conformist
transmission can stabilize costly enforcement of norms in cooperative dilemmas.
Journal of Theoretical Biology, 208(1), 79–89.
Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H., & Mcelreath, R.
(2001). Cooperation, reciprocity, and punishment in fifteen small-scale societies.
101

American Economic Review, 91(2), 73–78.
Henrich, J., Heine, S., & Norenzayan, A. (2010). The WEIRDest people in the world.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 33(2), 1–75.
Hijmans, R. J. (2017). geosphere: Spherical trigonometry.
Hill, K. R., & Kintigh, K. (2009). Can anthropologists distinguish good and poor hunters?
Implications for hunting hypotheses, sharing conventions, and cultural transmission.
Current Anthropology, 50(3), 369–378. https://doi.org/10.1086/597981
Hill, K. R., Walker, R. S., Božičević, M., Eder, J., Headland, T., Hewlett, B., … Wood,
B. (2011). Co-Residence Patterns in Hunter-Hatherer Societies Show Unique
Human Social Structure. Science, 331, 1286–1289.
https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1199071
Hill, K. R., Wood, B. M., Baggio, J., Hurtado, A. M., & Boyd, R. T. (2014). HunterGatherer Inter-band interaction rates: Implications for cumulative culture. PLoS
ONE, 9(7), e102806. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0102806
Hirshleifer, D., & Shumway, T. (2003). Good day sunshine: Stock returnsand the
weather. The Journal of Finance, 58(3), 1009–1032. https://doi.org/10.1111/15406261.00556
Hruschka, D. J. (2010). Friendship: Development, ecology, and evolution of a
relationship. Berkley: University of California Press.
Hruschka, D. J., & Henrich, J. (2006). Friendship, cliquishness, and the emergence of
cooperation. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 239, 1–15.
Jaeggi, A. V., & van Schaik, C. P. (2011). The evolution of food sharing in primates.
Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology, 65(11), 2125–2140.
102

Jordan, J. J., Rand, D. G., Arbesman, S., Fowler, J. H., & Christakis, N. A. (2013).
Contagion of cooperation in static and fluid social networks. PLoS ONE, 8(6).
Kahle, D., & Wickham, H. (2013). ggmap: Spatial visualization with ggplot2. The R
Journal, 5(1), 144–161.
Kaplan, H., & Gurven, M. (2005). The natural history of human food sharing and
cooperation. In H. Gintis, S. Bowles, R. Boyd, & E. Fehr (Eds.), Moral sentiments
and Material Interests: The Foundations of Cooperation in Economic Life (pp. 75–
113). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Kaplan, H., Hill, K. R., Cadelina, R. V., Hayden, B., Hyndman, D. C., Preston, R. J., …
Yesner, D. R. (1985). Food sharing among Ache foragers. Current Anthropology,
26(2), 223–246.
Kay, M. (2018). tidybayes: Tidy data and geoms for Bayesian models.
Kenrick, D. T., & Funder, D. C. (1988). Profiting from controversy: Lessons from the
person-situation debate. American Psychologist, 43(1), 23–34.
https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.43.1.23
Kraft, T. S., Venkataraman, V. V., Tacey, I., Dominy, N. J., & Endicott, K. M. (2018).
Foraging performance, prosociality, and kin presence do not predict lifetime
reproductive success in Batek hunter-gatherers. Human Nature.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12110-018-9334-2
Kruschke, J. K., & Liddell, T. M. (2018a). Bayesian data analysis for newcomers.
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 25(1), 155–177. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13423017-1272-1
Kruschke, J. K., & Liddell, T. M. (2018b). The Bayesian New Statistics: Hypothesis
103

testing, estimation, meta-analysis, and power analysis from a Bayesian perspective.
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 25(1), 178–206. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13423016-1221-4
Landy, J. F., Piazza, J., & Goodwin, G. P. (2016). When it’s bad to be friendly and smart:
The desirability of sociability and competence depends on morality. Personality and
Social Psychology Bulletin, 42(9), 1272–1290.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167216655984
Landy, J. F., & Uhlmann, E. (2018). Morality is personal. In K. Gray & J. Graham (Eds.),
Atlas of Moral Psychology (p. 121). New York: Guilford Press.
Latané, B., & Darley, J. M. (1968). Group inhibition of bystander intervention in
emergencies. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 10(3), 215–221.
https://doi.org/10.1037/h0026570
Lukaszewski, A., Gurven, M., von Rueden, C., & Schmitt, D. P. (2017). What explains
personality covariation? A test of the socioecological complexity hypothesis. Social
Psychological and Personality Science, 8(8), 943–952.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550617697175
Lyle, H. F., & Smith, E. A. (2014). The reputational and social network benefits of
prosociality in an Andean community. Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences, 111(13), 4820–4825. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1318372111
Lyon, B. E., & Montgomerie, R. (2012). Sexual selection is a form of social selection.
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 367(1600),
2266–2273. https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2012.0012
Macfarlan, S. J., & Lyle, H. F. (2015). Multiple reputation domains and cooperative
104

behaviour in two Latin American communities. Philosophical Transactions of the
Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 370(1683), 20150009.
https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2015.0009
Macfarlan, S. J., Quinlan, R., & Remiker, M. (2013). Cooperative behaviour and
prosocial reputation dynamics in a Dominican village. Proceedings of the Royal
Society B, 280(1761), 20130557. https://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2013.0557
Macfarlan, S. J., Remiker, M., & Quinlan, R. (2012). Competitive Altruism Explains
Labor Exchange Variation in a Dominican Community. Current Anthropology,
53(1), 118–124. https://doi.org/10.1086/663700
Marlowe, F. W. (2004a). Dictators and ultimatums in an egalitarian society of huntergatherers: The Hadza of Tanzania. In J. Henrich, R. Boyd, S. Bowles, C. Camerer,
E. Fehr, & H. Gintis (Eds.), Foundations of human sociality: Economic experiments
and ethnographic evidence from fifteen small-scale societies (pp. 168–193).
Marlowe, F. W. (2004b). Mate preferences among Hadza hunter-gatherers. Human
Nature, 15(4), 365–376. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12110-004-1014-8
Marlowe, F. W. (2005). Hunter-gatherers and human evolution. Evolutionary
Anthropology, 14(2), 54–67.
Marlowe, F. W. (2010). The Hadza: Hunter-Gatherers of Tanzania. Berkley: University
of California Press.
Martin, J. W., & Cushman, F. (2015). To punish or to leave: Distinct cognitive processes
underlie partner control and partner choice behaviors. PLoS ONE, 10(4), 9–14.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0125193
McElreath, R. (2016). Statistical Rethinking. Boca Raton, FL: Taylor & Francis.
105

McNamara, J. M., Barta, Z., Fromhage, L., & Houston, A. I. (2008). The coevolution of
choosiness and cooperation. Nature, 451(7175), 189.
McNamara, R. A., Willard, A. K., Norenzayan, A., & Henrich, J. (2019). Weighing
outcome vs. intent across societies: How cultural models of mind shape moral
reasoning. Cognition, 182, 95–108. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2018.09.008
Neuwirth, E. (2014). RColorBrewer: ColorBrewer Palettes.
Noë, R., & Hammerstein, P. (1994). Biological markets: Supply and demand determine
the effect of partner choice in cooperation, mutualism and mating. Behavioral
Ecology and Sociobiology, 35(1), 1–11. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00167053
Nowak, M. A. (2006). Five rules for the evolution of cooperation. Science, 314(5805),
1560–1563.
Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. (2005). Evolution of indirect reciprocity. Nature,
437(7063), 1291–1298. https://doi.org/10.1038/nature04131
Nowak, M. A., Tarnita, C. E., & Antal, T. (2010). Evolutionary dynamics in structured
populations. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences,
365(1537), 19–30.
Otto, A. R., Fleming, S. M., & Glimcher, P. W. (2016). Unexpected but incidental
positive outcomes predict real-world gambling. Psychological Science, 27(3), 299–
311. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797615618366
Page, A. E., Chaudhary, N., Viguier, S., Dyble, M., Thompson, J., Smith, D., …
Migliano, A. B. (2017). Hunter-gatherer social networks and reproductive success.
Scientific Reports, 7(1), 1–10. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-017-01310-5
Peysakhovich, A., Nowak, M. A., & Rand, D. G. (2014). Humans display a ‘cooperative
106

phenotype’ that is domain general and temporally stable. Nature Communications,
5(4939).
Peysakhovich, A., & Rand, D. G. (2015). Habits of virtue: Creating norms of cooperation
and defection in the laboratory. Management Science, 62(3), 631–647.
Pfeiffer, T., Rutte, C., Killingback, T., Taborsky, M., & Bonhoeffer, S. (2005). Evolution
of cooperation by generalized reciprocity. Proceedings of the Royal Society B:
Biological Sciences, 272(1568), 1115–1120.
Pinker, S. (2015). The false allure of group selection. In D. M. Buss (Ed.), The Handbook
of Evolutionary Psychology (pp. 867–880). Hoboken: Wiley.
Plummer, M. (2018). rjags: Bayesian graphical models using MCMC. Retrieved from
https://cran.r-project.org/package=rjags
Price, G. R. (1972). Extension of covariance selection mathematics. Annals of Human
Genetics, 35(4), 485–490.
Purzycki, B. G., Apicella, C. L., Atkinson, Q. D., Cohen, E., McNamara, R. A., Willard,
A. K., … Henrich, J. (2016). Moralistic gods, supernatural punishment and the
expansion of human sociality. Nature, 530(7590), 327–330.
https://doi.org/10.1038/nature16980
Purzycki, B. G., Pisor, A. C., Apicella, C. L., Atkinson, Q., Cohen, E., Henrich, J., …
Xygalatas, D. (2018). The cognitive and cultural foundations of moral behavior.
Evolution and Human Behavior, 39(5), 490–501.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2018.04.004
R, (CoreTeam). (2017). R: A language and environment for statistical computing.
Raihani, N. J., & Barclay, P. (2016). Exploring the trade-off between quality and fairness
107

in human partner choice. Royal Society Open Science, 3(11).
https://doi.org/10.1098/rsos.160510
Rand, D. G., Arbesman, S., & Christakis, N. A. (2011). Dynamic social networks
promote cooperation in experiments with humans. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences, 108(48), 19193–19198.
Rand, D. G., & Nowak, M. A. (2013). Human cooperation. Trends in Cognitive Sciences,
17(8), 413–425.
Rand, D. G., Nowak, M. A., Fowler, J. H., & Christakis, N. A. (2011). Static network
structure can stabilize human cooperation. Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences, 111(48), 17093–17098.
Schloerke, B., Crowley, J., Cook, D., Briatte, F., Marbach, M., Thoen, E., …
Larmarange, J. (2017). GGally: Extension to “ggplot2.”
Silk, J. B., & Boyd, R. (2010). From grooming to giving blood: The origins of human
altruism. In P. M. Kappeler & J. B. Silk (Eds.), Mind the Gap (pp. 223–244). New
York: Springer.
Smaldino, P., Lukaszewski, A., von Rueden, C., & Gurven, M. (2018). Niche diversity
can explain cross-cultural differences in personality structure.
https://doi.org/10.31234/OSF.IO/53WXG
Smith, D., Schlaepfer, P., Major, K., Dyble, M., Page, A. E., Thompson, J., … Migliano,
A. B. (2017). Cooperation and the evolution of hunter-gatherer storytelling. Nature
Communications, 8(1853).
Smith, Daniel, Dyble, M., Major, K., Page, A. E., Chaudhary, N., Salali, G. D., … Mace,
R. (2018). A friend in need is a friend indeed: Need-based sharing, rather than
108

cooperative assortment, predicts experimental resource transfers among Agta
hunter-gatherers. Evolution and Human Behavior, (August), 0–1.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2018.08.004
Smith, K. M., & Apicella, C. L. (2019). Partner choice in human evolution: The role of
character, hunting ability, and reciprocity in Hadza campmate selection.
https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/35tch
Smith, K. M., Larroucau, T., Mabulla, I. A., & Apicella, C. L. (2018). Hunter-gatherers
maintain assortativity in cooperation despite high levels of residential change and
mixing. Current Biology, 28(19), 3152-3157.e4.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2018.07.064
Smith, K. M., Olkhov, Y. M., Puts, D. A., & Apicella, C. L. (2017). Hadza men with
lower voice pitch have a better hunting reputation. Evolutionary Psychology, 15(4).
https://doi.org/10.1177/1474704917740466
Sosis, R., & Ruffle, B. J. (2003). Religious Ritual and Cooperation : Testing for a
relationship on Israeli religious and secular kibbutzim. Current Anthropology, 44(5),
713–722.
Stagnaro, M. N., Arechar, A. A., & Rand, D. G. (2017). From good institutions to
generous citizens: Top-down incentives to cooperate promote subsequent
prosociality but not norm enforcement. Cognition, 167, 212–254.
Stibbard-Hawkes, D. N. E. (2019). Costly signaling and the handicap principle in huntergatherer research: A critical review. Evolutionary Anthropology: Issues, News, and
Reviews. https://doi.org/10.1002/evan.21767
Stibbard-Hawkes, D. N. E., Attenborough, R. D., & Marlowe, F. W. (2018). A noisy
109

signal: To what extent are Hadza hunting reputations predictive of actual hunting
skills? Evolution and Human Behavior, 39(6), 639–651.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2018.06.005
Strohminger, N., Knobe, J., & Newman, G. (2017). The True Self: A psychological
concept distinct from the self. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 12(4), 551–
560. https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691616689495
Strohminger, N., & Nichols, S. (2014). The essential moral self. Cognition, 131(1), 159–
171. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2013.12.005
Sylwester, K., & Roberts, G. (2010). Cooperators benefit through reputation-based
partner choice in economic games. Biology Letters, 6(5), 659–662.
https://doi.org/10.1098/rsbl.2010.0209
Thalmayer, A. G., Saucier, G., Srivastava, S., Flournoy, J. C., & Costello, C. K. (2019).
Ethics-relevant values in adulthood: Longitudinal findings from the life and time
study. Journal of Personality. https://doi.org/10.1111/jopy.12462
Tooby, J., & Cosmides, L. (1996). Friendship and the banker’s paradox: Other pathways
to the evolution of adaptations for altruism. Proceedings of the British Academy, 88,
119–144.
Trivers, R. L. (1971). The evolution of reciprocal altruism. The Quarterly Review of
Biology, 46(1), 35–57.
van der Lee, R., Ellemers, N., Scheepers, D., & Rutjens, B. T. (2017). In or out? How the
perceived morality (vs. competence) of prospective group members affects
acceptance and rejection. European Journal of Social Psychology, 47(6), 748–762.
https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2269
110

Volk, S., Thöni, C., & Ruigrok, W. (2012). Temporal stability and psychological
foundations of cooperation preferences. Journal of Economic Behavior &
Organization, 81(2), 664–676.
West-Eberhard, M. (1983). Sexual selection, social competition, and speciation. The
Quarterly Review of Biology, 58(2), 243–260.
Wickham, H. (2009). ggplot2: Elegant Graphics for Data Analysis. New York: SpringerVerlag.
Wickham, H. (2011). The split-apply-combine strategy for data analysis. Journal of
Statistical Software, 40(1), 1–29.
Wickham, H. (2017a). scales: Scale functions for visualizations.
Wickham, H. (2017b). tidyverse: Easily install and load the “tidyverse.” Retrieved from
https://cran.r-project.org/package=tidyverse
Wilke, C. O. (2018). ggridges: Ridgeline plots in “ggplot2.” Retrieved from
https://cran.r-project.org/package=ggridges
Wilson, D. S., & Dugatkin, L. A. (1997). Group selection and assortative interactions.
The American Naturalist, 149(2), 336–351.
Wojciszke, B., Bazinska, R., & Jaworski, M. (1998). On the dominance of moral
categories in impression formation. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,
24(12), 1251–1263. https://doi.org/10.1177/01461672982412001
Wood, B. M. (2006). Prestige or provisioning? A test of foraging goals among the Hadza.
Current Anthropology, 47(2), 383–387. https://doi.org/10.1086/503068
Wood, B. M., & Marlowe, F. W. (2013). Household and kin provisioning by Hadza men.
Human Nature, 24, 280–317.
111

Young, L., & Tsoi, L. (2013). When mental states matter, when they don’t, and what that
means for morality. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 7(8), 585–604.
Zar, J. H. (1996). Biostatistical Analysis (3rd ed.). Upper Saddle River: Prentice-Hall.
Zeileis, A. (2004). Econometric computing with HC and HAC covariance matrix
estimators. Journal of Statistical Software, 11(10), 1–17.
Zeileis, A., & Hothorn, T. (2002). Diagnostic checking in regressions relationships. R
News, 2(3), 7–10.

112

